THE PROCEEDINGS

of

The South Carolina Historical Association

1970

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OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATION, 1970-71

President	Henry von Hasseln, Anderson College
Vice-President	Ronald D. Burnside, Presbyterian College
Secretary-Treasurer	Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College

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Wylma Wates, South Carolina Archives Department

C. W. Bolen, Clemson University

Editor of Proceedings
Lowry P. Ware, Erskine College

The South Carolina Historical Association supplies the *Proceedings* to all its members. The Executive Committee elects the Editor. Beginning in 1935, every fifth number contains an index for the preceding five years.

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1970

LOWRY P. WARE
Editor

COLUMBIA
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

THE FORTIETH ANNUAL MEETING
SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

The fortieth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association was held Friday and Saturday, April 24-25, 1970, at The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina. Approximately 75 members and guests attended one or more of the programs.

Following registration in the second floor foyer, the first session was called to order at 2:00 p.m. on Friday in Mark Clark Hall Auditorium, Association President Lowry P. Ware presiding. A. V. Huff, Jr. of Furman University read a paper on "Langdon Cheves in The War of 1812: Another Look at 'National Honor' in South Carolina," which was discussed by J. M. Lesesne, Sr., Erskine College. Dr. Lesesne was unable to attend the meeting and his comments were read by Robert K. Ackerman, Erskine College. John B. Edmunds, Jr., Spartanburg Regional Campus, University of South Carolina, then read a paper entitled "Francis W. Pickens and the War Begins," which was discussed by Robert J. Moore, Columbia College.

Preceded by a social hour in the Alumni House, the Banquet Session was convened in Coward Hall at 7:30 p.m. General Hugh P. Harris, President of The Citadel, extended a cordial welcome to members of the Association and their guests. Following the banquet, Dr. Richard Maxwell Brown, Professor of History, The College of William and Mary, read a paper on "White and Black in Eighteenth Century South Carolina," after which the meeting was adjourned.

A coffee hour in the Reception Room, Mark Clark Hall, preceded the second session which began at 9:30 a.m. on Saturday in Jenkins Hall Auditorium. Carlanna Hendrick, Columbia College, read a paper on "John Gary Evans Against The Columbia *State*," which was discussed by Foster Farley, Newberry College. The second paper, read by Marvin Cann, Lander College, and discussed by Daniel W. Hollis, University of South Carolina, was entitled "Burnet Maybank and Charleston Politics in the New Deal Era."

Luncheon was served in the private dining room, Mark Clark Hall, after which the annual business meeting was held. The minutes of the last meeting were approved as printed in the *Proceedings* and the Treasurer's report, copies of which were distributed at the luncheon, was adopted.

Miss Wates, for the Executive Committee, presented the following slate of officers for 1970-1971:

President: Henry von Hasseln, Anderson College

Vice-President: Ronald D. Burnside, Presbyterian College

Secretary-Treasurer: Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College

Executive Committee Member (term to expire 1973): C. W. Bolen, Clemson University

There were no nominations from the floor, and the motion that the slate be accepted by acclamation was seconded and passed.

It was announced that Dr. Ware would continue as Editor of *The Proceedings* and that Dr. Newton B. Jones's re-appointment to the South Carolina Commission on Archives and History would be recommended to Governor McNair.

In Dr. J. M. Lesesne, Jr.'s absence, Dr. George Rogers made a brief report on the activities of the Tricentennial Commission most of which have been reported in the press throughout the state during the past few months. The Commission hopes that all legal problems can be solved at an early date and that construction of the tourist centers can be completed so that tricentennial activities can proceed.

Dr. Ackerman, chairman of the tricentennial sub-committee on publications, reported that five booklets designed for popular audiences and one scholarly monograph have been published and that work on a series of edited documents is continuing.

Dr. Rogers reported that the scholarly symposium held at the University of South Carolina, March 19-21, 1970, was quite successful. The symposium, entitled "The Place of the Southern Colonies in the Atlantic World," was attended by 317 persons, representing 27 states and five foreign countries.

Vice-President-elect Burnside announced that the 1971 meeting of the Association would be held at Clemson University, the exact date to be announced later.

Dr. R. H. Wienefeld and Dr. Daniel W. Hollis read tributes to Dr. W. H. Callcott and Professor William A. Foran respectively, both of whom were very active in the Association during their lifetime. The motion was made, seconded and passed unanimously that the tributes be made an official part of these minutes, that they be printed in *The Proceedings*, and that copies be sent to the respective families. President Ware reported the death of Mrs. Robert W. Barnwell, a charter member of the Association, and indicated a similar procedure would be followed in her memory.

President-elect von Hasseln thanked The Citadel for its hospitality and the local arrangements committee, particularly Col. Charles L. Anger, for the excellent work that contributed so significantly to the success of the Association's fortieth annual session.

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned.

MRS. R. W. (FANNIE BELLE WHITE) BARNWELL
1908-1969

Fannie Belle White was a charter member of the South Carolina Historical Association, and served as its secretary-treasurer from 1933 through 1940. These were the formative years of the Association, and she served it well through the hard times of depression and bank failures.

Miss White was born in Belton, S. C. on September 15, 1908, and she graduated from Columbia College in 1928. For thirteen years, she taught history at Columbia High School. She also did graduate work in history, receiving a master's degree in History at the University of South Carolina in 1932, and later studying at summer sessions at Duke University, George Washington University, and the University of Chicago.

In 1942, she married Dr. Robert W. Barnwell which led to her removal outside of South Carolina, but she continued as a loyal member of the Association until her death, April 8, 1969.

In the words of the Columbia College Book of Remembrances, "As a student in college, Mrs. Barnwell was faithful to her obligations, capable and always a contributor to the best in college life. Out in life, she followed her high ideal of service, with that fidelity to duty which made her life rich and beautiful."

WILFRID HARDY CALLCOTT
1895-1969

Wilfrid Hardy Callcott was born in Guadalupe County, Texas, on 12 November 1895. He spent his early life and received his early education in an essentially frontier community. His college education was interrupted by a period of service in the United States Army Air Corps, 1917-1919, but upon the conclusion of the first World War he completed his baccalaureate degree at Southwestern University, Georgetown, Texas. He subsequently entered Columbia University where he obtained the Master of Arts degree in 1920, and the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1926.

While still engaged in his doctoral program he began teaching at the University of South Carolina in 1923 as an associate professor; within a few years of the completion of his doctorate he was promoted to the rank of full professor in 1929. It was during the depression years that he revealed his deep commitment to scholarly research – without the advantage of any appreciable released time from teaching, grants, or other inducements which, at present, are considered to be so essential to research. He had an almost inevitable interest in Mexico and this was reflected by the books he published: *Church and State in Mexico* (1926); *Liberalism in Mexico* (1931); and his biography of *Santa Anna* (1936). During these years his growing reputation as a scholar brought invitations from other institutions to serve as visiting professor: the University of North Carolina and from the University of Texas for summer appointments, and from Duke University for the academic year 1935-1936.

Despite the increasing academic pressures prior to the second World War, he extended his research into a broader field – that of the Caribbean. This led to an invitation from the Department of History at the Johns Hopkins University to deliver the Albert Shaw lectures in diplomatic history. When expanded these lectures were published in 1942 as the *Caribbean Policy of the United States.*

Towards the close of the second World War he was appointed Dean of the University's Graduate School. During his tenure of this office, 1944-1960, he not only laid the foundations for a sound program of graduate education at the University, but also played a prominent role in the improvement and expansion of graduate study in the Southern region. From 1948 to 1953 he served as the secretary of the Conference of Deans of Southern Graduate Schools, and in 1954-1955 he served as president of that organization. Paralleling this was his long service as a member of the executive committee of the Southern Fellowship Fund and as a member of the graduate commission of the Southern Regional Education Board, 1949-1951. While continuing as Dean of the Graduate School, he also served as Dean of the Faculty, 1955-1960, but these offices were relinquished when he became Dean of the University, 1960-1962.

Along with the burdens of administrative work for nearly two decades, he continued to teach, carried on his scholarly pursuits, and played an important part in the development of the University of South Carolina Press. When released from administrative duties he resumed an active academic life. In 1962-1963 he was at the University of Texas as visiting professor and, in the following year, went to Oxford University as a Fulbright lecturer. These appointments afforded further opportunity for the research that materialized in the publication of *The Western Hemisphere* in 1968.

When he retired from active teaching at the University upon the end of the academic year 1967-1968, he had completed his plans for the years immediately ensuing. In the autumn of 1968 he was at Wofford College as visiting professor and in the spring of 1969 he served as the President of Coker College. It was with anticipation that he returned to his native state in the late summer of 1969 to begin a year's appointment at the University of Houston. It was here that he was stricken by the illness to which he succumbed on 20th September 1969.

To those who knew him well, Wilfrid Callcott was not only a superior scholar, but also an inspiring and dedicated teacher. He was able to extract maximum performance from his students; he combined understanding with firmness; by influence and example he motivated many students to continue their studies for higher degrees. His love of learning and his high esteem for scholarship also permeated his family to an unusual degree.

As a member of the South Carolina Historical Association for more than thirty years his interest in its purposes always remained keen. To him the annual meetings were a source of pride and satisfaction in that these revealed the improving quality of instruction and the competency of teachers on the college and secondary school level – a development in which he had played an important part.

His passing has resulted in a genuine loss to the world of scholarship, to the teaching profession, and to the South Carolina Historical Association.

WILLIAM A. FORAN
1908-1968

William A. Foran, professor of history at the University of South Carolina, was born in Ithaca, Tompkins County, New York, on August 30, 1908. He resided in Tompkins County until he came to South Carolina in 1928 to enter the University in Columbia. At Carolina he won high scholastic honors, including membership in Phi Beta Kappa, and the transplanted Yankee made such an impression on South Carolina traditionalists Yates Snowden and Robert L. Meriwether that he was awarded the Wade Hampton Scholarship in History. He received his master's degree in 1934.

From 1935 to 1940 he pursued graduate study at Johns Hopkins University, and then returned to the University of South Carolina as a member of the history faculty, in which capacity he continued until his death on December 25, 1968.

The new professor soon gained the reputation of being a stimulating but unorthodox teacher. His stock in trade was the shock treatment. Infuriated students rushed to the library in search of material with which to refute his dogmatic assertions that John C. Calhoun was an opportunistic politician who led the South to disaster, or that Stonewall Jackson was a second-rate general. Students assailed him after class, and heated arguments continued in his office. The smarter students eventually caught on, but some of his more provincial ones never realized that this was simply his method of teaching them that "there is a big wide world north of Cheraw."

Foran was also a keen scholar. His article, "John Marshall as a Historian," was published in the *American Historical Review,* XLIII (October, 1937), while he was still a graduate student. "Southern Legend: Climate or Climate of Opinion," *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (1956), was referred to by William B. Hesseltine as the most significant article yet written on that subject. Unfortunately, poor health prevented him from completing a definitive study of James L. Orr.

Despite poliomyelitis, which struck him in his late teens, he led a full life. Twice married, he had four children. On the campus he was active in Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Beta Kappa, and Sigma Alpha Epsilon, and he took much interest in his memberships in the American, Southern, and South Carolina Historical Associations. Through the years he developed a deep love for South Carolina, and this expatriate New Yorker contributed much to the knowledge of its past and to the understanding of its present.

LANGDON CHEVES AND THE WAR OF 1812: ANOTHER LOOK AT "NATIONAL HONOR" IN SOUTH CAROLINA

ARCHIE VERNON HUFF, JR., Furman University

The debate among historians about the causes of the War of 1812 appears to have come full circle. The nationalist historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to varying degrees, espoused a maritime interpretation of the coming of the war. According to men like John Bach McMaster, the declaration of war resulted from continued violations of American rights on the seas by Great Britain. In the early years of the twentieth century Progressive historians began to search for economic factors, and the thirst for land in Canada or Florida, the fear of an Indian conspiracy, or the concern over agricultural depression in the West and South were all advanced as explanations for the decision to declare war in June 1812.[1]

Then in 1940 Alfred L. Burt, while giving a place to the more recent economic views, reasserted the older maritime-rights interpretation. Following his lead, a number of recent historians have argued the inadequacies of an economic interpretation and have emphasized the vindication of national honor, one of the central themes of the maritime-rights "school." One of these, Norman Risjord has written: "The War of 1812 was the most uneconomic war the United States has ever fought. A casual search through the letters and speeches of contemporaries reveals that those who fought the war were primarily concerned with the honor and integrity of the nation." Yet Risjord indicates that the "national honor" theme was one among many: "With mixed motives . . . a majority of Republicans followed the war hawks to war. It is nevertheless clear that a primary factor in the mind of each was the conclusion that the only alternative to war was submission . . . national humiliation and disgrace."[2]

In 1963 Bradford Perkins carried the historiographical discussion one step further. He concluded that the subject of causation was too complex to be subsumed under a single theory.

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[1] An older, but excellent summary of the historiographical controversy may be found in Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVII (1941-42), 171-86. A briefer, but more recent account is found in Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812*, Berkeley, 1963, pp. 422-37.

[2] Alfred L. Burt, *The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812*, New Haven, 1940; Norman K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation's Honor," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XVIII (1961), 196, 210; Roger H. Brown, *The Republic in Peril: 1812*, New York, 1964, p. 71.

> The war came, [Perkins writes], not for any single reason, but from the interplay of many. The nation did not want war, and surely it did not embark gleefully on a great crusade. Tired of the self-flagellation and the disgrace that had marked the years since 1805, propelled by the fear of ridicule for inconsistency and by an honest interest in the nation's honor, a sufficient number of congressmen allowed themselves to support war.[3]

It seems clear that the era of generalization about the causes of the War of 1812 on the basis of the evidence we now have is ended. Historians may continue to juggle this evidence, but rearrangement will yield little more than new statements of old positions. A new line of investigation which may prove fruitful is a study of each individual in the War Congress. Such a series of studies ought to yield a more complex, but more realistic, picture of the factors which influenced each man to vote for or against war. These studies should eventually result in a new general account. But first there must be an intensive search for the "interplay" of factors which affected the men who sat in the Twelfth Congress.

Historians of South Carolina's decision to go to war have followed closely the general trend of historiography, but have also given attention to a related issue, the nationalism of those urging war in 1812. In his massive *History of South Carolina,* David Duncan Wallace, described the State's support of Embargo and the war as "strongly nationalistic." South Carolina "loyally supported the Federal government in resisting French and British aggressions, even when the embargo was ruining her agriculturists and merchants." In an all-too brief sentence, Wallace says that the state supported war to defend the nation's commercial and maritime rights. In a political study of *Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina,* J. Harold Wolfe carefully demonstrated the divisions among Carolinians over the war, but he emphasized the nationalistic spirit of the Carolina Republicans who supported both the Embargo and the war in the face of serious economic consequences in order to preserve the integrity of the nation.[4]

Not until 1956 did a major revisionist interpretation of South Carolina's role appear. That year, Margaret Kinard Latimer published in the *American Historical Review* an article entitled, "South Carolina — A Protagonist of the War of 1812." Her view was essentially economic. She described the depression which plunged the state into distress after the passage of the Embargo, and found that after 1808 South Carolinians became increasingly concerned about international commerce on which they depended to get their products to market. By 1812 Carolinians had achieved a political

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[3] Perkins, p. 425.

[4] David Duncan Wallace, *The History of South Carolina,* New York, 1934, II, 385; J. Harold Wolfe, *Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina,* Chapel Hill, 1940.

and economic unity and supported war not so much to defend the national honor as to alleviate their financial distress. The vigorous actions of her representatives in Congress "revealed a strong bent toward nationalization," which was not so much activated by national honor as it was a way of protecting "the prevailing socio-economic system of their state . . . a sectionalism in disguise."[5]

It is the purpose of this paper to reassess the causes for war in South Carolina by investigating the actions of a single Congressman, attempting to uncover those influences which led him to support war in 1812. Perhaps the most-widely respected of the South Carolina representatives was Langdon Cheves of Charleston. He held more influential positions in the War Congress than any man save Henry Clay. At first he was appointed chairman of the Naval Affairs committee, later chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. Then, in 1814, when Henry Clay resigned, Cheves was elected Speaker of the House.

At thirty-four Cheves was already a member of that small group that ruled South Carolina. In appearance he was striking. Five feet ten inches tall, he towered over many of his contemporaries. His head, covered by a mass of auburn hair, was surprisingly large for his thin body, and his face, tinged with red, reflected the serious and intense nature of the man. One of the most successful lawyers in the state, he had served on the Charleston City Council and in the state legislature for three terms, where he was chairman of the Judiciary and Ways and Means committees. From 1808 to 1810 he served as South Carolina's Attorney-General.[6]

Cheves was not a member of the Carolina aristocracy by birth, however. He was born in 1776 in Ninety Six District, the son of a backcountry merchant who had come to South Carolina from Scotland to seek his fortune. Cheves's mother died when he was three years old, and the young boy was raised by an aunt and uncle. His father espoused the Loyalist cause during the Revolution and fled to Great Britain. Once the war was over, the elder Cheves returned to his adopted country and opened a small store in Charleston on King Street, the shopping district for the city's poorer residents. In 1785 he brought his ten year old son to live in the port city. After two years of schooling, Langdon was put to work in the store of a successful Scots merchant, a friend of his father. In four years he rose from sweeper to chief clerk, and his hard work,

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[5] Margaret K. Latimer, "South Carolina—A Protagonist of the War of 1812," *American Historical Review*, LXI (1956), 918, 923.

[6] Louisa C. McCord to Preston Powers, April 21, 1878, Langdon Cheves Papers, S. C. Historical Society, Charleston; Benjamin F. Perry, *Reminiscences of Public Men*, Philadelphia, 1883, p. 241; Samuel F. B. Morse, Portrait of Langdon Cheves, Cheves Papers.

talent, and reliability impressed a number of prominent Charleston merchants.[7]

By the time he was eighteen Langdon Cheves was seriously considering his future. Acquaintances urged him to make a career as a merchant. But the ambitious young man dreamed of becoming a member of the aristocracy that ruled his native state, and merchants were a race apart. As William Thatcher wrote: "I should think my own father an accomplished knave if he had ever at any time made money in the dry goods line in King Street."[8]

The aristocracy of South Carolina was not a closed society, however. For over a hundred years the successful *arrivistes* of one generation were accepted into the aristocracy of the next. Thomas Heyward, a prominent planter, once remarked to James L. Petigru: "There are always two aristocracies – the aristocracy of wealth [and family] and the aristocracy of talent . . . You belong to one and I to the other." Langdon Cheves had neither wealth nor family name. But his abilities equipped him for a place in the "aristocracy of talent."[9]

There was a bridge between the old aristocracy and the rising groups in Charleston, the legal profession. The great pre-Revolutionary merchants, who had stood beneath the aristocracy in their generation, had groomed their sons for the practice of law. And lawyers like John and Edward Rutledge were living proof that members of the "aristocracy of talent" might join the "aristocracy of wealth." At eighteen, young Cheves turned his eyes toward the law.[10]

For a young man without means, however, admission to the bar was a difficult goal. Cheves had no money with which to support himself during the years of apprenticeship, and his education seemed hardly adequate. Long after midnight, night after night, the clerk pored over bought or borrowed books to improve his general education. Within a year his employer died, and Cheves began reading law in the office of William Marshall, an "eminently gifted" Charleston attorney. After two years of study, in 1797, Cheves was admitted to the bar.[11]

The newly-qualified lawyer rented an office, but he was relatively unknown and had little business. He walked around the courthouse square,

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[7] Memoirs, Sophia Cheves Haskell and Louisa Cheves McCord, Cheves Papers.

[8] *Ibid.;* Charles Fraser, *Reminiscences of Charleston,* Charleston, 1854, pp. 10-11, 57.

[9] Wallace, *South Carolina, A Short History, 1520-1948,* Chapel Hill, 1951, p. 484; William J. Grayson, *James Louis Petigru: A Biographical Memoir,* New York, 1866, p. 61.

[10] George C. Rogers, Jr., *Evolution of a Federalist: William Loughton Smith of Charleston (1758-1812),* Columbia, 1962, pp. 112, 115-16.

[11] Haskell and McCord Memoirs, Cheves Papers; Charleston *City Gazette and Daily Advertizer,* October 17, 1795; John B. O'Neall, *Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina,* Charleston, 1859, I, 133, 233-35; Notes of Langdon Cheves III, Certificate of Admission to the S. C. Bar, Cheves Papers.

wondering "when the old lawyers would die."[12] Gradually, however, Cheves built a respectable legal practice, and in 1801 he attracted the attention of an established attorney, Joseph Peace, who offered the younger man a place in his office. Cheves readily accepted, and in the next few years the "talents . . . incorruptible integrity and invariable punctuality" of the junior partner began to be recognized. He was too honest, his friend Daniel Elliott Huger said, to take a bad case. It became a common saying in Charleston: "If you have a good case employ Cheves, but if you have a bad one, go to [William] Drayton." Within eight years, Cheves could write to his partner: "On a docket of 1500 causes and upwards we represented one side or the other in every third cause." The hardships of his early years were repaid with success. He profited over $10,000 a year, and in the two years before the partnership was dissolved in 1809 he made $20,000 annually.[13]

The young attorney became increasingly interested in politics. As a youth his interest in the military had drawn him into the political arena. Like many young men in Charleston, he joined one of the numerous militia companies in town. By 1795 he had become an officer in the Cadet Artillery, which met at J. H. Harris's tavern on the waterfront, a gathering place for seamen and artisans and the favorite meeting place for militia groups. There in August 1793, the military companies and a number of private citizens formed the Republican Society of South Carolina. It was an anti-Federalist group which idealized the French Revolution and decried the "monarchical" tendencies of the ruling Federal Party. Cheves may never have been an active member of the Republican Society, but he surely joined the Cadet Artillery in the numerous parades which hailed the victories of the revolution in France.[14]

How early Cheves became active in party politics we do not know. Having grown up among the merchants and artisans whose democratic ideas had flourished in the organizations that met at Harris's tavern the young lawyer was part of the generation that honored and respected the Federalists of the Revolutionary regime, but who rebelled against them

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[12] Receipted Bills, Louise H. Daly Manuscript Ketch of Langdon Cheves, Cheves Papers.

[13] William Lowndes to Mrs. Lowndes, January 2, 1811, William Lowndes Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina; Receipted Bills, Haskell Memoir, Notes of Langdon Cheves III, Cheves Papers; Abiel Abbott, "The Abiel Abbott Journals: A Yankee Preacher in Charleston Society, 1818-1827, "*S. C. Historical Magazine,* LXVIII (1967), 129-30; Perry, pp. 242-43; Cheves to Joseph Peace, May 4, 1811, Cheves Papers.

[14] Receipted Bills, Cheves Papers; Charleston *City Gazette,* February 19, 1800; Eugene P. Link, "The Republican Society of Charleston," *S. C. Historical Association Proceedings, 1943,* Columbia, 1943, pp. 25-27; Link, "The Democratic Societies of the Carolinas," *N. C. Historical Review,* XVIII (1941), 261-62; Fraser, pp. 35, 39-41.

because they semed to resemble the British placemen, whom they had forced out of office in 1776. As part of the vigorous Republican generation that took control of the state after 1800, Langdon Cheves was elected to the state House of Representatives. In 1806 and again in 1808 he led the ticket in Charleston. In 1808 he was overwhelmingly elected Attorney-General.[15]

In the twenty-three years since he had come to Charleston, Langdon Cheves had risen to a place of respect and honor. As an "aristocrat of talent" he had been accepted into the ruling councils of South Carolina. In a Fourth of July oration in 1810, Cheves lauded the "equality" of the society that had brought him wealth and fame:

> I mean . . . equality which denies the unjust pretensions of . . . birth or possessions, which founds distinction on merit and limits its duration to good behavior; while it is impartially just to the rich and great, will take the poorest citizen by the hand, and if he deserve them, lead him up to her seats of honor and crown him with her civic rewards.[16]

Perhaps without intending it, Langdon Cheves had traced his own rise in Carolina society.

Cheves's public involvement in the series of events which led South Carolinians to demand war in 1812 began in 1807 when the citizens of Charleston gathered to denounce the attack of the British ship *Leopard* on the *U.S.S. Chesapeake*. A series of resolutions was adopted, and a nonpartisan committee elected to enforce them included Langdon Cheves, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and his brother Thomas. That same year, when President Jefferson asked Congress to enact an Embargo, "inhibit[ing] . . . the departure of our vessels from the ports of the United States," the South Carolina delegation supported him.[17]

South Carolina suffered considerably from the Embargo, but in spite of the hardships the state continued to support Jefferson. Cheves supported the national administration in a series of letters in the *City Gazette* in the fall of 1808. The Embargo "is a measure, partly commercial and partly political," he argued. It was adopted to "save our seamen, our shipping and our property from capture," to "prevent our being involved in war,"

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[15] Rogers, pp. 344-49; James H. Broussard, "The Federalist Party in the South Atlantic States, 1800-1812," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1968, pp. 160, 151; Wolfe, pp. 182, 197.

[16] Cheves, *An Oration Delivered at St. Philip's Church . . . on the Fourth of July, 1810*, Charleston, 1810, p. 16. An alternative view of Cheves is presented by William W. Freehling in *Prelude to Civil War*, New York, 1966, pp. 202-203. Freehling described Cheves as "an extremely sensitive man who never quite forgot his plebeian origins, poor education, and early financial struggles, had always remained somewhat aloof from lowcountry society."

[17] Wolfe, p. 215; Louis M. Sears, *Jefferson and the Embargo*, Durham, 1927, pp. 59-60.

and to "coerce" the European powers "into a toleration of a fair neutral trade." War would be "stupid" and "senseless." "We are not singular in not enjoying the advantages of commerce – there is a pause in the commerce of the world, such as no age has witnessed, and such as no time will probably not again produce." [18]

Two years later, however, in 1810, South Carolinians were freely expressing their dissatisfaction with non-intercourse and repeated European disregard of American rights on the high seas. At the annual dinner of the Seventy-Six Association, Cheves heard the Eleventh Congress, which had adopted no firm course in the face of repeated British aggression, toasted in highly unflattering terms: "Words! words! words! – may their successors simulate the wisdom and energy of the Congress of '76." [19]

Increasingly, the citizens of Charleston began to look for a candidate for Congress who would support decisive action. "Sidney," writing in the Republican *City Gazette,* urged: "To remedy, as far as can be remedied, the evils brought upon us by the tenth and eleventh Congress, choose *other men* for the *twelfth;* men who will seek out the path of their country's honor." He suggested that "a CHEVES, a SMITH, and CALHOUN" were "qualified to be your Representatives." A "large portion of the republican party fixed their minds" on Langdon Cheves as their candidate,[20] and soon the *City Gazette* began to support "CHEVES AND REPUBLICANISM":

> His character, whether moral or political, will bear the strictest investigation. He will not be a mere eye and no member, but with Demosthenian eloquence will vindicate his country's honor and restore Carolina to that rank in the councils of the nation, to which her members and wealth so justly entitle her[21]

The Federalists nominated no candidate, and Cheves was elected to Congress without opposition. [22]

The election of 1810 could hardly be termed a revolution. To Congress South Carolina sent eight men whose average age was only six years younger than its members in the Eleventh Congress. Three of these – Richard Winn, William Butler, and Thomas Moore – were re-elected. Elias Earle of Greenville had served in the Ninth Congress and in 1810 had beaten his perennial opponent. David R. Williams had served in the Ninth and Tenth Congresses and was elected to the Twelfth when the incumbent, his brother-in-law, declined to stand for re-election. The only newcomers

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[18] Charleston *Courier,* January 20, 1808; [Cheves], *Aristides, or a Series of Papers on the Presidential Election . . .,* Charleston, 1808, pp. 51-52, 73-74, 23, 5.

[19] Sears, pp. 98, 240; Wolfe, pp. 234-35; Charleston *City Gazette,* July 6, 1810.

[20] *Ibid.,* June 25, 1810; *Courier,* October 12, 1810; E. S. Thomas, *Reminiscences of the Last Sixty-Five Years,* Hartford, 1840, II, 50-52.

[21] *City Gazette,* July 31, 1810.

[22] *Courier,* October 11, 1810.

to Congress were Langdon Cheves, John C. Calhoun, and William Lowndes, all of whom had served their political apprenticeship in the state legislature. Cheves and Calhoun were unopposed, and Lowndes defeated John Taylor of Columbia. It is not at all clear that the international situation was an issue in the campaign outside Charleston. The major difference in South Carolina's new delegation was the election of four members whose views reflected the growing impatience of their constituents with peaceful efforts at seeking redress from Great Britain and whose talents and experience could lead the new Congress to decisive action.[23]

Langdon Cheves's congressional service began earlier than he had anticipated. In December the Charleston representative resigned, and Cheves was elected to serve the unexpired term. The major issue before Congress when Cheves took his seat in January 1811, was the international crisis. In debate the new Congressman arose to express his own discontent and that of his constituents with the government's feeble efforts at asserting the nation's rights. A "more direct and proper course should long ago have been resorted to," he said. The people, he was convinced, were in favor of strong measures. "I believe the time is not far distant when it will be the interest and true wisdom of the Government, as it is the actual disposition of the people, to resist the injuries inflicted on us." The member from South Carolina had declared for war.[24]

By the end of the session Cheves had gained the respect of the House. His service on two committees prepared him for a more prominent role in the next session, and the careful logic of his speeches insured him of a hearing in debate. When he returned to Charleston to get his affairs in order, he heard daily the demands of his constituents that Congress take firm action against Britain. They "are beginning to look forward to the meeting of Congress to ascertain whether they will, or can, do anything to relieve the Nation from its present embarrassments."[25]

On his return to Washington in October Cheves was joined by William Lowndes who expressed "much anxiety" to discuss the political situation with Cheves "because I believe that [his views] either are or will be those of nearly all the members from Carolina." The two congressmen found lodg-

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[23] *Courier*, December 13, 1810; See sketches of the new Congressmen in the *Biographical Dictionary of Congress*, Washington, 1961; Carl J. Vipperman, "William Lowndes, South Carolina Nationalist, 1782-1822," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1966, pp. 70-71.

[24] *Biographical Dictionary*, p. 78; *Courier*, December 18, 1810, January 2, 1811; *Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States* [1789-1824], Washington, 1834-56, 11th Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 22, 884, 886, hereafter referred to as *Annals of Congress*.

[25] *Annals of Congress* 11:3, pp. 901, 1097; William Simons to William Page, October 21, 1811, William Page Papers, University of North Carolina; Perkins, p. 295.

ings together in one of the "messes" or boardinghouses on Capitol Hill. Men from the same state or region usually shared the same mess, and these boardinghouses were the vital centers of political activity in Congress. According to James S. Young, "those who lived together, voted together with a high degree of regularity," so that "a national institution was a series of sectional conclaves."[26]

Cheves and Lowndes settled into a "comfortable mess" with Calhoun, Henry Clay of Kentucky, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, and Senator George Bibb of Kentucky. In the parlor they gathered every night for a caucus which lasted sometimes far into the morning. Much of the strategy of the Twelfth Congress was planned in the parlor of the "War Mess," as it came to be called. Here came the leaders of Congress as did Secretary of State James Monroe, the liaison between the President and the House of Representatives, and Washington soon recognized that the members of the War Mess were "confessedly the best informed and most liberal men of their party."[27]

As the members of Congress gathered in the capital, there seemed to be agreement among the Republican majority that the government must take firm action against Britain. "All agree," wrote George Poindexter of the Mississippi Territory, "that something must be done." Such determination was strongest among congressmen from the South and West. The leaders of that group lived in the War Mess.[28]

The first public indication that a new spirit dominated Congress came on the opening day. The first order of business was the election of a Speaker, and Henry Clay, senior member of the War Mess, was elected overwhelmingly. Clay's leadership was strengthened by the call to arms in the President's message. "The period is arrived," the President said, "which claims from the Legislative guardians of the national rights a system of more ample provisions for maintaining" the country's defenses. Madison did not mention war in his message, although he explicitly said that "the national spirit and expectations" demanded preparations for war. In the privacy of their mess Monroe gave Clay and his associates "the strongest

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[26] Lowndes to Mrs. Lowndes, October 23, 1811, Lowndes Papers; Receipted Bills, October 28, 30, 1811, Cheves Papers; Lowndes to Mrs. Lowndes, February 2, 1812, Lowndes Papers; James S. Young, *The Washington Community, 1800-1828*, New York, 1966, pp. 103, 98.

[27] Lowndes to Mrs. Lowndes, November 2 or 3 [1812], May 21, 1812, (?), 4, 1812, December 7, 1, 1811, Lowndes Papers; Vipperman, p. 82; William Reed to Pickering, February 18, 1812, cited in Bernard Mayo, *Henry Clay, Spokesman of the New West*, Boston, 1937, p. 446.

[28] Brown, pp. 44, 53.

assurances that the President will cooperate zealously with Congress in declaring war if our complaints are not redressed."[29]

Meanwhile the Speaker put his War Mess colleagues into positions of power. In appointing committees he relied on seasoned men for chairmen and packed the membership with men he could trust. Cheves, whose efforts during the last session had already distinguished him, was named chairman of the Select Committee on Naval Affairs and second man on the Ways and Means Committee.[30]

Cheves's chief contribution to the preparedness effort came in December, when he introduced a bill to authorize expansion of the navy. In defending the measure Cheves reflected the interest of his Charleston constituency in protecting its shipping trade, but he appealed for Western support by denying that "the protection of maritime commerce . . . affect[s] only the Atlantic portions of the country." Concern for trade "extends as far as the utmost limits of its agriculture, and can only be separated from it . . . by a total blindness to the just policy of government." An adequate navy would "prevent all attacks from reaching our shores," and would "constitute the cheapest defense of the nation." For two days in January 1812, Cheves defended the navy as the only effective protection for "our commerce and our neutral rights on the ocean." Without an adequate navy the commerce of the country was indefensible. And commerce was no special interest, for even in a largely agricultural nation "the interests of agriculture and commerce are inseparable."[31]

Debate in the House raged for ten days. Every argument Cheves had advanced in favor of a navy was attacked. His fellow Carolinian, David R. Williams, "spoke at considerable length" against "the policy of building a navy at all." Cheves was supported by a number of his colleagues, but the opposition was too great. The section of the bill providing for the construction of frigates was struck out by three votes, with three upcountry South Carolinians – Earle, Butler, and Williams – voting against construction. A proposal for a dockyard was defeated by four votes, with four Carolinians, Butler, Moore, Winn, and Williams – again, all upcountrymen – among the majority.[32]

Cheves's advocacy of the navy won him no support among more traditionally-minded Republicans, including the upcountry Carolinians. But his efforts were well-received in Charleston. His "talents in legislative

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[29] *Annals of Congress* 11:2, pp. 11-14; Lowndes to Mrs. Lowndes, December 7, 1811, Lowndes Papers.

[30] *Annals of Congress* 11:2, pp. 333-34, 343.

[31] *Ibid.* 12:1, pp. 553-56, 803, 751, 807, 805.

[32] *Ibid.* 12:1, pp. 999-1005, 1029-30.

capacity" were toasted by the Washington Light Infantry. His efforts, they said, were "directed to the honor and happiness of his constituents." Letters appeared in the *City Gazette* favoring preparedness and, in particular, a strong navy.[33]

Yet war had not come. Early in March the members of the War Mess decided that decisive action had been delayed long enough. "In private" they met with Monroe to press for a declaration of war. In Charleston, Cheves's constituents, too, were demanding action. On May 20, a large body of citizens, both Republicans and Federalists, adopted a series of resolutions favoring war. The "repeated aggressions and hostile conduct of the Belligerents . . . justify an immediate declaration of war," and the "wise and energetic measures of Congress for the maintenance of the National Honor" were praised. The resolutions were adopted with "great unanimity, enthusiasm, and applause," and Cheves proudly presented them to the House.[34]

Madison sent his war message to Congress on June 1, and in secret session the House voted for war three days later. The entire South Carolina delegation supported the majority. The Senate concurred, and the President signed the formal declaration on June 18. In the War Mess there was an air of elation that the war, for which they had all waited so long, had finally come. "Like school boys," Cheves later remembered, the members of the mess "sprang up, and in the excess of their joy danced . . . reel."[35]

Vindication for Cheves came in the election that fall. National division over the war had inspired the Federalists to wage a vigorous campaign against the incumbent Republicans. In Charleston Colonel John Rutledge, Jr. entered the lists against Cheves, supported by the Federalist *Courier*. Charleston Republicans quickly took up the challenge. The *City Gazette* commended "South Carolina that her Representatives" were "instrumental of producing a War which one day will prove the salvation of this country." The "learned Cheves, the solid Lowndes," and "the brilliant Calhoun . . . enabled South Carolina to claim a distinguished rank among the states of the union." Cheves assured his supporters he valued "more highly than money, the confidence of that community who have been his only patrons in life." They alone "have given him all that he has, and

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[33] Samuel Taggart, "Letters of Samuel Taggart, Representative in Congress, 1803-1814," *American Antiquarian Society Proceedings*, New Series, XXXIII, 379; *City Gazette*, February 25, 1812; Wolfe, pp. 246-47.

[34] Lowndes to Mrs. Lowndes, March 23, 1812, Lowndes Papers; Citizens Meeting, Charleston, S. C., May 20, 1812, James Madison Papers, Library of Congress; Wolfe, p. 247; Lehre to Madison, June 6, 1812, Madison Papers; *Annals of Congress* 12:1, p. 1479.

[35] Perry, p. 245; Charles Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun*, Indianapolis, 1944, I, 66.

made him whatever he is." In the election Cheves won an overwhelming vote of confidence.[36]

In December 1812, Cheves outlined his views on the causes of the war. A bill to enlarge the army was before the House, and Cheves arose to "close the debate." The war, he argued, was "just and necessary." Any war is just if it is waged "to protect and defend the violated pecuniary interests of a country; or to defend and secure the sovereign rights and independence of a country; or, lastly and principally, to support and maintain the national honor. The last, indeed, embraces all the others." To wage a war solely for "pecuniary rights" is not justifiable, but economic freedom cannot be separated from "the security of all other rights." To "abandon any interest is to abandon all, and to protect one is to protect all." The specific "causes of war" were "the Orders in Council . . . the spoliations of our commerce . . ., and the impressment of our seamen." The war was "called for by popular opinion," Cheves said. "The people were not satisfied with the temporizing and pacific measures [of the] Government."[37]

Like each of his colleagues in Congress, Langdon Cheves faced the question of war in 1812. He enthusiastically supported it, not as a representative of any political or economic unity in South Carolina, as Latimer would have it, but as a member of the Charleston aristocracy. Having risen from obscurity to a position of wealth and prominence, Cheves supported the interests of his adopted city as his own. Like his fellow citizens he protested British violations of American maritime rights, so vital to Charleston's interests. He felt that England's aggressions against American shipping were severe insults to the national honor, and he supported the efforts of the Republican administration to retaliate by economic means. Even when the Embargo proved disastrous to the economy of Charleston, neither Cheves nor his constituents wavered in their support. Only when it seemed that the Embargo and subsequent measures had failed to halt aggression, did they demand redress by war. Both Cheves and his Charleston constituents grew impatient when they saw that the entire nation was not willing to make whatever sacrifice was necessary to vindicate the national honor. Cheves's vigorous efforts in Congress to prepare for war centered on expansion of the navy, a measure which would have protected the shipping trade of his district as well as have provided for the defense of the whole nation. His preparedness

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[36] Henry Adams, *History of the United States*, New York, 1921, VI, 412-14; Elizabeth Cometti, "John Rutledge, Jr., Federalist," *Journal of Southern History*, XIII (1947), 218; *Courier*, August 10, October 9, 10, 7, 8, 1812; *City Gazette*, September 3, October 13, 1812; *Courier*, October 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 1812.

[37] *Annals of Congress* 12:2, pp. 827-30, 834-35, 842.

measures and his support for war were applauded at home by impatient Charlestonians. Though Cheves recognized that there were a number of "causes" for war, he expressed no doubt that the principal "cause" was "to support and maintain the national honor." And the national honor, as Cheves understood it, was not separate from, but included protection of the nation's – and Charleston's – economic interests.

In his support of the measures leading to war in 1812, Cheves increasingly demanded firm action by the federal government. In championing the Embargo, preparations for war, a strong navy, and war itself, he affirmed the exercise of strong federal power. But to conclude that Cheves supported such measures because he held a "strongly nationalist" view of the federal government, as Wallace described it, is to conclude too much. Rather than being an advocate of strong central government, he supported the interests of his own district, first and last. Those measures which he considered in the best interest of Charleston were those he also considered good and right for the nation as a whole. Nor was he a doctrinnaire Jeffersonian Republican. When other Republicans in Congress differed with him, Cheves voted for measures he believed would serve Charleston best. And there is no indication that he considered the interests of South Carolina except as they were viewed from Charleston. When his fellow Carolinians voted against him, Cheves remained firm in his commitment to local interests. For the interests of Charleston were his interests as well.

FRANCIS W. PICKENS AND THE WAR BEGINS

John B. Edmunds, Jr.

By the middle of November 1860 South Carolina was seething with emotion. Already several members of her Congressional delegation had resigned, and an election for delegates to a state convention to meet on December 17 had been approved by the state legislature. It was in the midst of this furor that Francis Pickens, who had been serving as a minister to Russia, returned home. His ship docked in New York. On his way home, Pickens stopped in Washington and had a lengthy interview with President James Buchanan, who asked him to use his influence on behalf of moderation.[1]

One prominent New Yorker wrote that Pickens' object in coming home was to tell his fellow Carolinians that they were making themselves a laughing stock.[2] At first he did advocate moderation, urging his state to work in concert with other Southern states and to postpone any radical move until Buchanan left office, but this suggestion was ridiculed by the disunionists, whose sentiments were mounting in epidemic proportions. It was at the point that Pickens changed, becoming infected by secession fever. Instead of urging cooperation, he modified his views and urged disunion, provided no way could be found to resolve sectional differences. On November 30, in a Columbia speech, which obviously appealed to the hot-blooded Carolinians, he stated that he would be willing to "appeal to the god of battles . . . cover the state with ruin, conflagration and blood rather than submit."[3] Pickens was not only telling the attentive masses what they wanted to hear, but also paving his way to the governor's office, where he would assist in leading the state down the road to "ruin, conflagration and blood."

The keenly observant Mary Boykin Chesnut, whose husband had recently resigned his seat in the United States Senate, commented on Pickens' reversal. "Wigfall," she wrote, "says that before he left Washington, . . . Pickens and Trescot were openly against secession. Trescot does not pretend to like it now, but Pickens is a fireater down to the ground."[4]

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[1] Samuel W. Crawford, *The History of the Fall of Fort Sumter*, New York, 1889, pp. 79-81.

[2] George T. Strong, *Diary of the Civil War, 1860-1865*, ed. Allan Nevins, New York, 1962, p. 76.

[3] Charleston *Courier*, December 3, 1860.

[4] Mary Boykin Chesnut, Diary, December, 1860. Williams-Manning-Chesnut Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

It was widely predicted that Robert Barnwell Rhett, the so-called "father of secession," would be elected governor, but there were many people in the state who opposed his election, feeling that his views were even too radical for radical South Carolina. One contemporary wrote: "For God's sake and the sake of our beloved state, don't let Rhett be elected governor."[5]

In early December the Palmetto State seemed to have turned back toward conservatism of the South Carolina variety. On December 16, many candidates were put forward in the governor's race. When the Rhett forces were not able to gain votes, Rhett dropped out of the contest on the fifth ballot, and Pickens won the race by a slight majority on the seventh.[6] It is doubtful if anyone knew what beliefs the new Governor espoused. He had in the past preached moderation, but now he seemed to have shifted his position after sensing the mood of the Carolinians. It is possible that the legislature in electing Pickens felt that his past reputation as a South Carolina moderate and his closeness to Buchanan would place the state in an ideal position to negotiate for the forts and resolve the problem before Lincoln was inaugurated. Since he was labeled a moderate, many hoped that he would be able to bring the diverse elements together and create harmony out of chaos. M. L. Bonham probably best expressed the situation when he wrote: "We see that Pickens is elected but do not know what it indicates."[7]

The state was readying itself for action, but no one, including the new Governor knew what lay ahead. One thing is certain. He was to encounter problems such as no past or future chief executive of the state would experience. Many of his difficulties were caused by misunderstandings; others by outside influences. Unfortunately, the new Governor lacked the magnetism and personal popularity that was so essential at that crucial period. "He was a man of ideas, an acute observer, but not a man of positive action."[8] He said of himself, "I believe it my destiny to be disliked by all who know me well."[9]

In the early days of his administration the new Governor was given extraordinary powers. An executive council was set up which was de-

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[5] D. L. Wardlaw to Samuel McGowan, December 3, 1860. McGowan Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

[6] Pickens defeated Benjamin J. Johnson by a vote of 83 to 64. *Edgefield Advertiser*, December 19, 1860; *House Journal*, 1861, pp. 164, 167, 176, 180, 198.

[7] M. L. Bonham to W. H. Gist, December 16, 1860, Bonham Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; Charles E. Cauthen, *South Carolina Goes to War, 1860-1863*, Chapel Hill, 1950, p. 80; F. W. P. to M. L. Bonham, December 5, 1860, Bonham Papers.

[8] Cauthen, p. 80.

[9] F. W. Pickens to Lucy Pickens, February 23, 1861, in the possession of A. T. Graydon, Columbia, S. C.

signed to function like a cabinet. It consisted of the lieutenant governor and five other members who were to represent the convention within the administration.[10] Pickens was authorized by the convention to levy war, negotiate treaties, send and receive ambassadors. Also his appointive powers were greatly increased. He was given the responsibility of negotiating with Buchanan and sending commissioners to the other Southern states to urge secession. In reality he had been transformed from the position of state governor to the head of the sovereign Palmetto republic. Pickens was confronted by problems that he could have hardly foreseen. The state needed coastal defenses and troops to man these installations. The militia was inadequate and had to be armed, trained, and provided with leadership. Before the state joined the Confederacy all actions dealing with military and logistical problems were the responsibility of the governor. All intelligence and engineering reports had to be reviewed by Pickens, and it was his decision as to how these reports would be handled ultimately.[11]

On December 20, 1860, four days after the gubernatorial contest, the secession convention declared South Carolina to be out of the Union. The state embarked on the new and dangerous experiment of secession with no plans having been formulated to provide the state with a government adequate to her needs. The problems that the government faced would have been immense if secession had occurred under the most favorable circumstances, but with war clouds on the horizon and a frenzied populace, the pressures were immeasurable.

"South Carolinians had exasperated and heated themselves into a fever that only bloodletting could cure," reported Mrs. Chesnut.[12] The state was sailing an uncharted course, and her new Governor was faced with a problem that was irritating to the Carolinians. The forts in Charleston Harbor were regarded by many people as both a threat and insult. Unfortunately, the Governor's first efforts at diplomacy proved to be unsuccessful; instead of solving the problem he made it worse. The day after taking office Pickens wrote Buchanan informing the President that the forts in the harbor were being readied to turn their guns upon the city and that the federal arsenal in Charleston had been turned over to the state.[13] The Governor requested that Buchanan allow him to send

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[10] Lowry P. Ware, "South Carolina Executive Councils of 1861 and 1862," unpublished master's thesis, University of South Carolina, 1952.

[11] E. M. Law Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina; Pickens Papers, South Carolina Archives, Columbia; Pickens-Bonham Papers, Library of Congress; Cauthen, pp. 8-209.

[12] Chesnut, Diary, December 1860.

[13] F. W. P. to Buchanan, December 17, 1860, in W. A. Harris, ed., *The Record of Fort Sumter,* Columbia, 1862, pp. 7-8.

a small force to take possession of unoccupied Fort Sumter. The President became alarmed, and called in William Trescot, who was functioning unofficially as South Carolina's representative in Washington. Actually, the arsenal had not been turned over to South Carolina, and the Governor had raised an issue over the forts in the harbor. Trescot hoped that the crucial situation could rest in abeyance until South Carolina sent commissioners to bargain for the forts, but in this instance the Governor showed that his zeal was stronger than his discretion.[14] The Governor had made the first of many blunders.

Pickens later explained that he corresponded with the president for the purpose of gaining a better understanding regarding the forts in order to chart his (Pickens) own course.[15] The tense situation demanded that the President take action to prevent the South Carolinians from unleashing the war dogs. A frantic Buchanan, who had already sacrificed much personal prestige, sent his friend, Caleb Cushing, to South Carolina in hopes that some way might be found to maintain the *status quo,* at least until Lincoln took office.[16] When Cushing arrived he found that he was too late. South Carolina had embarked on an irreversible course. Excitement was high and the secession convention was in full progress. Pickens realized there was to be no turning back. He candidly informed Cushing "that there was no hope for the Union."[17]

After secession had been inaugurated the convention resolved that any attempt by the United States to build up the fortifications would be regarded "as an overt act of war."[18] The "overt act of hostility" that many thought would come, occurred during the evening of December 26, 1860. This was the first of many events that were to cause the Governor great embarrassment and unpopularity. Pickens, at the request of the Convention, ordered the harbor to be constantly patrolled in order to stop any movement from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter by the Union force under

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[14] William Trescot to F. W. P., December 21, 1860, *Ibid.,* p. 80.

[15] *Message Number 1, of his Excellency Francis W. Pickens to the Legislature Meeting in Extra Session, November 5, 1861,* Columbia, 1861; W. A. Swanberg, *First Blood,* New York, 1957, pp. 89-95.

[16] W. H. Trescot to F. W. P. December 21, 1860. *Record of Fort Sumter . . .* "He had removed Colonel Gardiner from command of Fort Moultrie, for carrying ammunition from the arsenal at Charleston. He refused to send reinforcements to the garrison; he had accepted the resignation of the oldest, most eminent and highest member of his cabinet, rather than consent to additional force, and the night before your letter arrived, upon a telegraphic communication that arms had been removed from the arsenal to Fort Moultrie, the Department of War issued prompt orders, by telegraph, to the officer removing them, to restore them immediately."

[17] Claude M. Fuess, *The Life of Caleb Cushing,* New York, 1923, II, 273. Diary of Edmund Ruffin, December 18, 1860. Edmund Ruffin Papers, Library of Congress.

[18] Journal of the South Carolina Convention, December 27, 1860. South Carolina Archives.

its new commander, Major Robert Anderson. It was at this time that the Governor began to reap much verbal abuse. Many felt that, instead of keeping Anderson from abandoning Fort Moultrie the Governor should have ordered the forts seized. Pickens had been assured by Trescot, who was still in Washington, that no attempt would be made by the Union to occupy Sumter.[19] But Trescot's letter and Pickens' constant vigil did not prevent Anderson from moving his command from untenable Fort Moultrie to Sumter right under the Governor's nose. Many blamed the Governor for what had happened. Mrs. Chesnut referred to him as a "dead head."[20]

Instead of waiting for action by the commissioners who had been sent to Washington to negotiate for the forts, the Governor took immediate steps, asking Anderson to return his forces to Moultrie, but the federal commander refused.[21] The Governor then made a serious blunder, ordering his military commanders to take the abandoned forts and to occupy a position off the Charleston bar.[22] The forts were federal property. Thus the order to seize the installations constituted an act of aggression against the United States. It is conceivable that, if the Governor had bided his time and complained to Buchanan, Anderson would have been ordered to leave his island.[23] Such might have been the case, but in this instance it appears that the clamor of public opinion left the Governor no choice but to take the federal properties in and around Charleston.

Great energy was being expended on both sides to ready the forts for the conflicts that everyone knew was eminent. Buchanan decided that Anderson should be supplied, but took a long time in implementing his decision. Instead of sending a warship, the President sent a merchant vessel, *The Star of the West,* which set sail on January 5, 1861. Though the ship was officially bound for New Orleans, Pickens was warned that the vessel should be expected in South Carolina waters.[24] On January 9, action took place that ordinarily would have precipitated war. On that morning the *Star of the West* entered Charleston Harbor. The guns on

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[19] W. H. Trescot to F. W. P., December 21, 1860 in *The Record of Fort Sumter.*

[20] Chesnut Diary, December 27, 1860; Wade Hampton to Fisher Hampton, December 17, 1861, Hampton Papers, Southern Historical Collections, University of North Carolina.

[21] Diary of Samuel W. Crawford, December 28, 1860, Samuel W. Crawford Papers, Library of Congress.

[22] F. W. P. to Col. J. J. Pettigrew, December 27, 1860, F. W. P. to General Schnierle, December 27, 1860, *The Record of Fort Sumter;* F. W. P. to Capt. J. Carrington, January 1, 1861, and F. W. P. to Military Commanders, December 27, 1860, Samuel W. Crawford Papers; Mayor Charles MacBeth to F. W. P., December 30, 1860, Pickens Papers, Duke University Library.

[23] Diary of Samuel W. Crawford, December 28, 1860; Swanberg, p. 123.

[24] Louis Wigfall to F. W. P. [Telegram], January 8, 1861, Pickens Papers, South Carolina Archives.

Morris Island and Fort Moultrie fired on the ship, scoring several hits, but Anderson did not permit his guns to retaliate. However, he warned the Governor that if the act was not disclaimed, he would "regard it as an act of war" and that he would not permit any vessel to pass within range of Sumter.[25] Pickens claimed that any effort to reinforce the fort would be regarded as an act of hostility.[26] On the same day that the *Star of the West* was fired upon, Pickens called together his officers to "consider . . . the most favorable plan . . . to reduce the fortress."[27] The fortifications in the harbor were feverishly strengthened. The Governor planned to take the fort if necessary, but unlike Rhett and the *Mercury,* he desired to see bloodshed prevented if possible. He decided to ask Anderson to give up the fort. He must have realized before he sent his request to the major that it would be rejected. Obviously he was hoping that Anderson, who was painfully aware of the increased activity, would see that resistance was futile and abandon the fortress.[28] Anderson replied that he could not comply with the Governor's demand.[29]

Major Anderson suggested that the Governor send a representative to Washington in order to ascertain how the President intended to handle the inflamed situation. Isaac W. Hayne, South Carolina's attorney-general was dispatched with an ominous message in which the Governor once again asked Buchanan to give up the fort, claiming Fort Sumter to be a threat to the state which could inevitably lead "to a bloody issue."[30] Hayne arrived in Washington on January 12 and had an unofficial interview with the President two days later. The senators of other Southern states agreed that the occupation of Sumter by the Union was just cause for irritation, but they urged forbearance and requested Hayne to defer from delivering Pickens' letter until they made suggestions to both the Governor and the President. If hostilities were to come, the Southern leaders wanted to avoid them until after the meeting of the Montgomery Convention of February 15, that was to form the Confederate States of America.[31] Buchanan made it clear that he was willing to maintain the *status quo* provided no hostile action was commenced against the fort.

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[25] Major Robert Anderson to F. W. P., January 9, 1861 in *Edgefield Advertiser* January 16, 1861. *Charleston Courier* January 10, 1861. Charleston *Mercury* January 10-16, 1861.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] F. W. P. to Cols. Gwynn, White and Tropier, January 9, in *The Record of Fort Sumter.*

[28] F. W. P. to Anderson, January 11, 1861, Crawford Papers.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] F. W. P. to Buchanan, January 11, 1861 in *Edgefield Advertiser,* February 13, 1861, Crawford, pp. 195-96.

[31] F. W. P. to Robert Toombs, February 12, 1861, Crawford Papers; I. W. Hayne to F. W. P., January 16, 1861, Pickens-Bonham Papers.

He explained that he had no more right to cede federal property to South Carolina than to "sell the capitol of the United States to Maryland."[32] It was becoming more difficult for the Governor to refrain from taking action. While the Edgefield paper and other upstate papers defended his lack of action, Rhett's *Mercury* asked: "Will South Carolina sit quietly with folded arms, and see a fort garrisoned by our enemies? I'll never ——"[33] Cooler heads were still advising delay as the Governor's policy. Governor J. E. Brown of Georgia, Robert Toombs, the future Confederate secretary of state, and Jefferson Davis all advised against precipitate action.[34] In South Carolina, however, the overwhelming sentiment seemed to be for an immediate storming of the fortress.[35] Pickens was accused of sacrificing the honor of the state. One Carolinian wrote: "Pickens counts delay and to obtain this he sends and keeps sending men . . . to talk with Old Buck . . . the state . . . is being disgraced everyday . . . and there is much dissatisfaction with Pickens . . ."[36] William Henry Ravenel, a prominent South Carolina botanist and planter, wrote that "there is great dissatisfaction prevailing at the course of Governor Pickens. . . . He is overbearing, haughty and rude."[37]

The Governor was in a dilemma, caught between the desires of the Carolinians and those of the Southern leaders. But by February 6, Hayne, South Carolina's negotiator in Washington, reported that conferences between himself and Buchanan had broken down. Hayne came home urging Pickens to stage an immediate attack on the fort.[38] The Governor continued to stall. While Hayne was in Washington, Pickens had an excuse for remaining inactive, but with Hayne at home preaching instant war, the fireaters were becoming even more vociferous. The Governor longed for the problem of Sumter to be lifted from his shoulders. He suggested to a friend that Maryland and Virginia secede and seize Washington before it was adequately fortified.[39]

Matters continued to drag on while tempers remained feverish. The South Carolina delegates at the Montgomery Convention presented that

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[32] *Ibid.;* Crawford, pp. 226-34.

[33] *Edgefield Advertiser,* January 30, 1861; Charleston *Mercury,* January 19, 1861.

[34] Crawford, p. 266; F. W. P. to Robert Toombs, February 12, 1861, Crawford Papers; F. W. P. to Jefferson Davis, January 28, 1861 in *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and Speeches,* Jackson, Miss., V, 39-40.

[35] Columbia *Southern Guardian* quoted in the *Edgefield Advertiser,* January 30, 1861.

[36] S. W. B. [not identifiable] to a Mrs. Coleman, January 27, 1861, William Dunlap Simpson Papers, Duke University Library.

[37] *The Private Journal of Henry William Ravenel, 1859-1887,* ed. Arney Robinson Childs, Columbia, 1947, p. 51.

[38] Ware, p. 20.

[39] Swanberg, p. 193.

assembly with a clear ultimatum either to unite and accept the Sumter problem as a common obligation, or let the Carolinas attack the fort. For the first time, Pickens saw an opportunity to wash his hands of the matter and at the same time save face. The Governor wrote Robert Toombs that if the Confederate Congress would "indicate jurisdiction . . . then I would not hesitate to abide most cheerfully by your control."[40] Much to the delight of the Governor, the Confederate Congress decided to shoulder the burden of Sumter. Immediately the Governor's tone and attitude changed. A dauntless Governor replaced an ordinarily cautious one. Pickens now urged that the fort be taken, informing the Confederate government that he was prepared for action. The new government was slow to act, and many South Carolinians were fearful that war of independence would never come. A bold Pickens promised in the last days of February that the fort would be taken. In a letter to his beautiful and flirtatious wife, who had gone to Texas, Pickens reported that he had five hundred men ready to storm Anderson's little island.[41] He made a fiery speech while "about half drunk" to the Citadel cadets in which he reiterated his promise.[42] On March 6, Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard arrived on the scene, resulting in the further fortification of Charleston Harbor.[43] Pickens urged that the popular Beauregard's command be expanded to include the entire coast, thus relieving the Governor of this responsibility.[44]

Meanwhile, on March 4, Lincoln was inaugurated. He vowed that the power confided to him would be used to "hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government."[45] Negotiations were attempted by the Confederate government with the new President, but they were to no avail. When Lincoln ultimately determined to provision the fort, the inevitable occurred. Firing commenced on April 12, 1861. The Governor was jubilant. Instead of being cursed, he was applauded. Actually he had little to do with the situation, but he took as much credit as possible.[46] Pickens, who had never been known for his humility, was puffed with pride when he spoke to the masses in the street from the balcony of the Charleston Hotel. In a speech full of "I's" he stated that the victorious results were not attributable solely to his skill. Nevertheless,

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[40] F. W. P. to Toombs, February 12, 1861, Crawford Papers.

[41] F. W. P. to Lucy Pickens, February 23, 1861, property of A. T. Graydon, Columbia, S. C.

[42] Robert L. Cooper to Thomas B. Fraser, February 23, 1861, T. B. Fraser Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

[43] *Edgefield Advertiser,* March 13, 1861.

[44] F. W. P. to Jefferson Davis, March 17, 1861, Crawford Papers.

[45] Inaugural Speech of Abraham Lincoln in Charleston, *Daily Courier,* March 13, 1861.

[46] T. Harry Williams, *P. G. T. Beauregard, Napoleon in Gray,* Baton Rouge, La., 1954, p. 56.

he did not fail to remind the populace that "I was determined to maintain our separate independence and freedom at any and every hazard . . . when I knew we were prepared, I was ready to strike . . . we have rallied; we have met them . . . let it lead to what it might, even if it leads to blood and ruin . . . we have defeated their twenty millions, we have met them and conquered them."[47] The *New York Times* soberly editorialized: "The curtain has fallen upon the first act of the great tragedy of the age."[48] The war that the fireaters had hungered for was now the prospect. The gay times of the Carolinians were numbered, but in the closing days of April excitement and joy ruled the Palmetto State, although the once reluctant Pickens' new popularity was to prove to be ephemeral.

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[47] Charleston *Mercury,* April 16, 1861. In the fort there were 9 officers, 74 non-commissioned officers and 43 laborers.

[48] *New York Times* as quoted in Charleston *Mercury,* April 18, 1861.

JOHN GARY EVANS AGAINST THE COLUMBIA *STATE*

CARLANNA HENDRICK

When Vice-President Spiro Agnew publically criticized the press and television of the nation for biased reporting, he apparently reflected the views of many modern Americans.[1] In the mid-twentieth century, impartial reporting is demanded, and even such commentary as may be found on the editorial pages of the daily newspapers is expected to avoid harsh personal attacks. How different this attitude appears when contrasted with the press of an earlier America. In the nineteenth century, with rare exception, to be unbiased was to be dull and to be always fair was to risk public apathy.[2]

No newspaper better reflected the fervid days of reporting than the Columbia *State*.[3] Founded by N. G. Gonzales in 1891 to oppose the rising strength of the white masses under the leadership of Benjamin Ryan Tillman, it led all competitors in vitriolic comment and personal attacks. Its rowdy efforts to guide the votes of the state's electorate were designed to oust the hated Tillmanites and restore South Carolina to the rule of the old redeemers (or, as the Tillmanites saw it, the Charleston-Columbia clique of special interests).

The chief concern of the *State* was the defeat of Ben Tillman and his movement; but so powerful was Tillman among the populace that the *State* found it necessary to temper its attacks upon him. No such restraint was necessary, however, for the brood Tillman carried into office with him. The *State* could and did launch attacks of extraordinary bitterness against those men who, because of their close association with Tillman, epitomized the movement second only to Tillman himself.

A primary focus of the wrath of the *State* was the "Tillmanikin" John Gary Evans.[4] Scion of an old and honored family in South Carolina, John Gary Evans was the favorite nephew of Martin Witherspoon Gary whose split with Wade Hampton laid an important cornerstone for the rise of the upcountry under Tillman. An unlikely spokesman for the common man, Evans represented the class of lawyers and aristocrats most often challenged by Tillman.[5] Sharing public office with a host of his relatives

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[1] November 13, 1969.

[2] F. L. Mott, *American Journalism A History: 1690-1960*, New York, 1962, pp. 167-69, 215-16, 253.

[3] S. J. Latimer, Jr., *The Story of The State 1891-1969 and the Gonzales Brothers*, Columbia, 1970, pp. 14-15. N. G. Gonzales wrote that "care should be taken that the paper is not made so lamblike as to be inane. . . . It must hold opinions and express them boldly or it will lose its moral force."

[4] Columbia *State*, December 7, 1895.

[5] Evans was what in the twentieth-century would be called a corporation lawyer. He was on the board of directors of two railroads, a bank and a manufacturing company. See chapter I, Carlanna L. Hendrick, *John Gary Evans: A Political Biography*, unpublished dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1966.

(in spite of Tillman's protest against this practice by the older conservatives), Evans nevertheless was Tillman's closest political associate.[6]

While it was often difficult to attack Tillman with full vigor, the *State* found no such restraint of public affection to limit its criticism of John Gary Evans. From his first major appearance on the public stage as a Tillmanite leader of the State Legislature in 1890, through the twilight of his career in the second decade of the twentieth century, the *State* waged unceasing war against Evans. For him it reserved its snidest remarks, its least subtle sneers, and its most severe criticism. The voters of South Carolina were frequently urged to vote against Evans. The opposition of the *State* was a major factor in the four political defeats suffered by Evans as he campaigned for a seat in the United States Senate.[7] The power of the press in South Carolina never again reached the heights achieved by the *State* as it successfully thwarted the ambitions of John Gary Evans.

The strength of Tillman was of no avail against the *State*. As the *State* attacked Evans, by implication it attacked Tillman. Evans became a scapegoat who bore the brunt of criticism and hostility against the entire Tillman movement, and against Tillman himself. Evans was not a powerful enough character to justify the venom and consistency of the attacks against him. Only in his role as surrogate for the larger figure of Ben Tillman did he become an opponent worth the attack.

In addition to the oblique attack upon Tillman through Evans, the *State* quite genuinely despised John Gary Evans. Much of the criticism levied against Evans was valid or, in context of South Carolina politics in the 1890's, to be expected as he acted against the conservative interests represented by the *State*. But the attacks were far too violent to be explained only by the issues, and they reflected a bitter distaste for Evans.

The hostility between Evans and the *State*, most pronounced during the Senatorial campaigns, stretched back almost to the founding of the *State*. Evans, who had been only moderately pro-Tillman during his first term in the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1888, by 1891 had emerged as Governor Tillman's major supporter in the House. The *State*, quite naturally, found little favor in Evans because of his political position. In addition, Evans' quarrels with John C. Haskell, a stalwart leader of the conservatives, also angered the *State*.[8]

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[6] Evans' three first cousins, Eugene B. Gary, Frank B. Gary, and Ernest Gary all held high state office; his distant cousins, W. D. Evans and William H. Ellerbe were also prominent; and his brother, Nathan George Evans, was active in the Democratic party. Evans remained loyal to Tillman and kept Tillman's support long after Tillman had broken with his other prominent lieutenants, J. L. M. Irby and John L. McLaurin.

[7] Evans was defeated for the Senate in 1896, 1897, 1902 and 1908.

[8] *State*, December 16, 1891, May 19, 1892.

The *State* recognized Evans as a political opponent after his election to the South Carolina Senate in 1892. There Evans continued his role as the leading advocate of Governor Tillman's program, and increased his own prominence to the point that he was widely mentioned as the most likely successor to Tillman.[9] Especially galling to the *State,* however, was Evans' role in the passage of the Dispensary Bill in 1892. The *State* violently opposed the dispensary from the first suggestion of such a liquor system, and Evans' crucial role in its passage made him equally a subject for criticism.[10]

In 1894, Evans' gubernatorial candidacy came as no surprise. A series of Machiavellian maneuvers within the ranks of the reformers (i.e., Tillmanites) prior to the Democratic primary hinted at bossism in South Carolina.[11] The *State,* generally disinclined to support Evans, became more particular in its dislike. It characterized one of his speeches as "a spontaneous, type-written, pre-Raphaelite improvisation," and labelled Evans as a "glibgabglob."[12]

Dissension within the ranks of the reformers provoked the *State* satirically to announce that it would support Evans for governor. Damning with faint praise, it defended Evans against charges made by John L. McLaurin that he was a "Squedunk."[13] The *State* lavishly defended Evans against charges of drunkenness by describing the author of the dispensary bill as the "Peter the Hermit of a great temperance crusade."[14] It also began a continuing policy of mocking his name, placing particular emphasis upon the Gary, and its implication of family status.[15] The campaign for the reform primary ended with a clear victory for Evans over his cousin William H. Ellerbe. There was no opposition in the Democratic primary, and Evans easily defeated Sampson Pope in the general election.[16]

The new governor was treated with scorn by the *State.* Even nonpartisan actions, such as participation in the Atlanta Exposition were criticized. The *State's* dismal expections appeared justified when Evans made

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[9] *State,* December 11 and 13, 1893; *Columbia Daily Register,* November 29, 1892.

[10] *Journal of The Senate of The General Assembly of The State of South Carolina, Being The Regular Session Commencing November 22, 1892,* Columbia, 1893, pp. 419-504; 527; *State,* December 24, 1892; *Daily Register,* December 24, 1892; Hendrick, pp. 71-76.

[11] Hendrick, pp. 83-85, 89, 97-100.

[12] *State,* March 6, 1894. The *State* had earlier commented that Evans' "invective excelled the eloquence of Dags Marquis in a dime show." December 23, 1893.

[13] *Ibid.,* April 22, 24, 28, 30, May 3, 4, 1894.

[14] *Ibid.,* April 30, May 2, 1894.

[15] The *State* variously printed his name as "john Gary evans," "Johngaryevans," "demijohngaryevans," and "Jagaree". December 16, 1893, March 6, 11, May 2, 3, 1894, January 29, 1896.

[16] *Daily Register,* December 1, 1894. The final vote was Evans 37,703, Pope 16,703.

an inflammatory chauvinistically Southern speech at Atlanta.[17] N. G. Gonzales violently opposed a plan to elect Evans as president of a business company to promote a South Carolina exhibit at Chicago. Evans was elected, much to the dismay of Gonzales who believed that Evans had neither the business experience nor the high moral character to qualify for the office.[18]

Evans' continued support of the dispensary was objectionable to the *State,* but the enforcement of the law was anathema. The Gonzales brothers went to court over a raid made by dispensary constables on the exclusive Columbia Club, of which they were members.[19] This clash was minor, however, compared with the statewide furor which erupted when Evans sent the controversial Metropolitan Police into Charleston to enforce violations of the dispensary law. The *State* editorial entitled, "The Sword of Jagaree," was highly critical of the police and of Evans.[20] The use of the Metropolitan Police was by far the most controversial administrative issue during Evans' tenure as governor.

The dispensary law itself was tested in the federal court as Judge Nathan Goff issued an injunction against the seizure of liquor brought into the state.[21] Evans publically defied the court and continued to seize the incoming liquor to the horror of the *State.*[22] The *State,* referring to Evans' campaign description of himself as a gamecock, remarked that he "wears his gaffs in his mouth and carries his cock tail in a flask."[23]

One of Evans' major tasks as governor was to preside over the Constitutional Convention of 1895. He had supported a new charter since 1890 and, with Tillman, was active in obtaining public support for it. Evans again defied the federal courts in 1895 when Judge Goff declared the preconvention registration law unconstitutional.[24] Evans, appealing to white supremacy, argued that the Supreme Court would uphold the South Carolina law and continued with plans to hold the convention.[25] Political maneuvering among the reformers and conservatives enlivened state politics as each faction sought representation in the convention. The

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[17] Hendrick, pp. 107-112; *State,* December 1, 1895.

[18] *State,* April 17, 1896.

[19] *Ibid.,* August 18, 19, 23, 31, 1895. The court upheld the Gonzales brothers, but Evans refused to accept the verdict as final. December 3, 1895.

[20] *Ibid.,* January 29, 1896. The *State* bitterly suggested that the Metropolitan Police be called "Jagites" or "Jagevites", much as the London Police were named after their founder, Robert Peel. January 30, 1895.

[21] *Ibid.,* April 21, 1895.

[22] *Ibid.,* April 22, 1895.

[23] *Ibid.,* April 24, 1895.

[24] *News and Courier,* May 10, 1895.

[25] *Ibid.,* May 11, 1895; *Daily Register,* May 15, 1895. The Circuit Court, in this instance, agreed with Governor Evans, and upheld the law. *State,* June 12, 1895.

State, dismayed by the entire proceeding, began to run twin banners at the masthead of the paper proclaiming "Liberty and Truth," and "Honest Elections for South Carolina."[26]

The Constitutional Convention met in Columbia, and Evans was elected president. While the *State* thought that Evans "seemed competent to handle the convention, and showed premonitory symptoms of his intention to handle it freely," it later conceded that Evans was "less partisan than he might have been."[27] Its final verdict, however, was that no one could remember a worse presiding officer than Evans.[28] The editor of the *State* was censured by the convention for the paper's charge that Evans had falsified the count on a vote to accept the name Saluda for a new county.[29]

The *State* remained critical of Evans throughout his governorship. In 1896, the newspaper described his message to the legislature as one that began and ended "with [a] characteristic outburst of inveracious gasconade."[30] It found the legislature "almost beneath contempt" for allowing itself to be bossed by Evans.[31] The editor argued that Evans "has been an unworthy officer. He has been small and cheap and mean. He has squandered large opportunities and sacrificed high obligations to petty, spiteful considerations."[32]

When Evans left the governorship, the *State* rejoiced, and editorially allowed him "Health, wealth or happiness," hoping it would be "enjoyed at a considerable distance from the executive office of South Carolina or any position of public trust in this state."[33]

The personal attacks of the *State* were directed primarily against Evans' four campaigns for the United States Senate. Particularly in the primary of 1896, the *State* played a major role in his defeat. The *State's* attack was originally provoked by a *New York Times* article which criticized Tillman and Evans for their part in refunding the state debt in 1892-93. It suggested that state officials had shared in the commissions paid to the South Carolina broker by the Baltimore syndicate which placed the bonds.[34]

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[26] *State,* June, 1895. The banners remained until after the elections in November, 1896.

[27] *Ibid.,* September 11, 12, 1895.

[28] *Ibid.,* September 30, 1895. It also spoke of Evans' "unscrupulous and desperate unfairness." September 17, 1895.

[29] *Ibid.,* September 17, 19-21, 1895; *Daily Register,* September 22, 1895. The convention upheld Evans' integrity by a vote of 123 to 23.

[30] *State,* January 15, 1896. It had earlier editoralized that if "Johngaryevans could convince people that his ability is equal to his bluster, he might have a larger and better following." August 2, 1894.

[31] *Ibid.,* March 8, 1896.

[32] *Ibid.,* January 18, 1897.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] *Ibid.,* June 6, 1896.

Evans presented from the stump a statement on the bond question which emphatically denied any wrong doing. The crowd was apparently convinced and gave Evans loud vocal support.[35] In spite of the explanation, however, the *State* began a series of anti-Evans editorials which continued for the remainder of his public life. It apparently never altered its proclaimed opinion that "There is no one in public life in South Carolina whom we despise as we do John Gary Evans."[36]

The primary of 1896 continued to be a lively one. Evans repeated his bond statement so often that the crowds refused to hear it any more. John Duncan, however, continued to attack Evans on the bond issue, in spite of the denials. Judge Joseph Earle made a valiant effort to discuss the issues of the day, especially the tariff and free silver. His good intentions failed, however, and at Florence the Judge and the incumbent Governor engaged in a fist fight on the platform – much to the disgust of the *State*.[37]

A second issue was created when Duncan charged that Evans and Tillman not only condoned the practice of distillers granting rebates to certain citizens, but had shared in these dispensary rebates. The *State* was delighted with the allegations of skulduggery in the hated dispensary system. Earlier the editors had asked "who got the commissions;" now a second question was put to the voters – "who got the rebates."[38] In spite of the bond and dispensary issues, Evans was expected to win the primary. The *State* was elated beyond expectation when the first primary returns showed Evans 311 votes short of a majority.[39]

The second primary was even more exciting. Gonzales began a series of editorials which played a great role in the outcome of the election and led Evans to charge prejudice on the part of the press.[40] The *State* called Evans a "fourth-rate man," "an unfaithful public servant," and the "littlest, cheapest, shallowest, narrowest, most besmirched and most contemptible candidate who ever aspired to a seat in the Senate."[41] Tillman himself intervened on Evans behalf, and Earle demanded that Tillman not dictate to the people how they should vote.[42] Political strife, charges of fraud in the bonds, and dispensary explanations abounded as the day for the second primary drew near. The *State* filled every page of its paper with

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[35] *Ibid.*, June 17, 23, 1896; Hendrick, pp. 173-195.

[36] *State*, December 13, 1895. The Anti-Evans editorials are found from June through December, 1896.

[37] *Ibid.*, July 25-28, 1896.

[38] *Ibid.*, July 28, 1896.

[39] *Ibid.*, August 28, 29, 1896. The final vote was Evans, 38,807; Earle, 31,092; and Duncan, 8,337.

[40] *Ibid.*, September 3-12, 1896.

[41] *Ibid.*, August 16, 24, September 4, 1896.

[42] *Ibid.*, September 3, 5, 1896.

reminders of Evans' unfitness for office, and called on all conservatives to join with reformers in a vote for Earle, and not to "let a little thing like Evans come between them."[43]

The campaign of 1896 was the high point of political factionalism in South Carolina and hostility never again divided the electorate with quite such bitterness. While many factors played a part in Evans' defeat, the editorial efforts of the *State* contributed heavily.[44] The press encouraged a large conservative turnout for the second primary, as well as continuing its emphasis upon Evans' lack of fitness for the office. Evans retired gracefully, reaffirming his loyalty to the Democratic party, Tillman, and the reformers.

Evans' retirement to private life was brief. Three months after taking office, Senator Earle died and South Carolina hummed with speculation about his successor.[45] Prominently mentioned were Evans and Congressman John L. McLaurin who had received the interim appointment to the Senate from Governor Ellerbe.[46] A third Tillmanite aspirant, J. L. M. Irby, threw his hat into the ring, as did S. G. Mayfield and John Duncan.[47] The *State,* the Columbia *Daily Register* and the Charleston *News and Courier* formed a pool of reporters to cover the primary – which they correctly expected to be largely a repeat of the 1896 primary.[48] Having apparently learned a lesson in defeat, Evans kept to the issues on the stump. With five candidates in the race the *State* did not attack Evans with its accustomed vigor. Instead, McLaurin was given a general endorsement.[49] Only occasionally did the Columbia journal warn its readers that "some sins have been committed in the name of tariff reform but the election of John Gary Evans would be easily the most dreadful of them."[50] The *State* urged all voters to support McLaurin and was vindicated when he won the primary without the need for a run-off.[51]

When the Senate seat, twice denied him, was open again in 1902, Evans prepared for his third race, despite Tillman's comment that "I am sure you stand no chance."[52] A run-off appeared likely with six candidates

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[43] *Ibid.,* September 8, 1896.

[44] *Ibid.,* August 4, 12, September 11, 13, 1896; *News and Courier,* October 26, 1896.

[45] *State,* May 21, 1897.

[46] *Daily Register,* May 26, 1897.

[47] *State,* July 5, 6, 1897.

[48] *Ibid.,* July 6, 1897.

[49] *Ibid.,* July-August, 1897.

[50] *Ibid.,* August 19, 1897.

[51] *Ibid.,* August 12, 30-31, September 1-4, 1897. The final vote was McLaurin, 29,326; Evans, 11,375; Irby, 5,159. Mayfield and Duncan withdrew before the election.

[52] B. R. Tillman to J. G. Evans, June 17, 1901. Evans MSS collection, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

in the race.[53] Since the *State* concentrated on defeating Jim Tillman in the gubernatorial primary, Evans was not the central target of verbal abuse.[54] In an exceptionally close race, Evans and A. C. Latimer went into the second primary.[55]

The *State,* having successfully aided in the defeat of Jim Tillman, next turned to Evans. Nearly its full editorial page was devoted to anti-Evans comment every day between the first and the second primary. The *State* reprinted many of its 1896 remarks about Evans and reminded its readers that he was the same man in 1902 that he had been in 1896, when his integrity was questioned.[56] Latimer defeated Evans in the second primary and the *State* happily editorialized: "Three Strikes and Out for John Gary Evans."[57] It took full credit for the part it had played in his defeat.

Three strikes though it may have been, Evans was by no means out. By 1908 he was ready for a fourth try for the Senate. With a platform praised even by the usually hostile Charleston *News and Courier,* Evans hoped finally to obtain the elusive prize.[58] Six candidates in addition to Evans entered the race, thus again making likely a second primary.[59] In a three way race, Evans defeated R. G. Rhett to go into the run-off against E. D. Smith.[60]

True to form, the *State* used all of its editorial power to defeat Evans in the second primary. Each day it devoted all of its editorial page and much of its front page to anti-Evans articles, opinion and political cartoons. It laughingly noted that "Cousin John" was "the best holder of second base that ever played the game."[61] The *State* attacked his business associations, the wealth of offices held by the Gary family, and his past (and disreputable) record.[62] For the fourth and final time, though still only forty-five years old, Evans retired rather gracefully after a major political defeat.[63]

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[53] In addition to Evans, the candidates were William Eliott, A. C. Latimer, D. S. Henderson, George Johnstone and J. J. Hemphill.

[54] *State,* July-August, 1902. This vigorous campaign must have influenced Jim Tillman's assassination of N. G. Gonzales in January, 1903.

[55] *Ibid.,* August 30, 1902. Latimer received 22,971 votes to Evans' 17,893. The other four candidates received over 13,000 votes each.

[56] *Ibid.,* September 1-9, 1902.

[57] *Ibid.,* August 30, 1902.

[58] *News and Courier,* February 14, 15, 1908.

[59] In addition to Evans, the candidates were George Johnstone, O. B. Martin, W. W. Lumpkin, R. G. Rhett, E. D. Smith, and J. P. Grace.

[60] *State,* August 26-29, 1908.

[61] *Ibid.,* September 2, 1908.

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[62] *Ibid.,* September 1-10, 1908. The *State* editorialized that "'Dam,' when sandwiched between 'whole' and 'family,' is not a 'cuss word.' It is the simpli-spelling for 'Gary-Evans.'" September 5, 1908.

[63] The vote was Smith, 70,436; Evans, 39,498. *News and Courier,* September 13, 1908.

Remarkably lacking in bitterness, Evans continued to be interested and occasionally active in South Carolina politics. Elected chairman of the State Democratic Party in 1912, he and Tillman led the South Carolina delegation in support of Woodrow Wilson.[64] Evans returned to the State Legislature in 1923, apparently unnoticed by the *State* which no longer saw in him a worthy antagonist. The battle was over.

When Evans died in 1942, the *State* gave front page coverage to an Associated Press report of his death, but made no editorial comment.[65] However, another old antagonist, W. W. Ball, editor of the *News and Courier,* wrote a moving tribute to Evans.[66] He evaluated Evans as "an indiscreet politician" who, in spite of his mistakes, "did excellent service to South Carolina." Ball believed that Evans' "personal integrity and patriotism was beyond reproach," perhaps setting to rest, once and for all, the old charges of 1896.

The *State,* which once declared that "impartial history will crown John Gary Evans as King of the Demagogues," apparently never altered its evaluation.[67] As the *State* increased its circulation and its influence, it became a major vehicle by which South Carolinians learned of their public officials. Its ceaseless condemnation of Evans colored the attitudes of a generation of South Carolinians. Evans' role in South Carolina is generally unknown, obscured by Tillman's priority, his own Senatorial failures, and to no small degree, the help of the Columbia *State.* For ten years Evans dominated the news and government of South Carolina, occasionally surpassing the prominence of Tillman himself. His valid accomplishments are, however, obscured by his flamboyant ineptness as a politician. The *State* held the shield of his obscurity and, for the researcher, it is almost impossible to penetrate the views of the *State* and discover the real John Gary Evans. The *State* called Evans a creature of Tillman, but to the modern historian, the Evans who emerges from the past is the creature, not of Tillman, but of the Columbia *State.*

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[64] *State,* May 15, 16, 1912. Here, too, controversy plagued his career. A letter to the editor of the *State* from John L. McLaurin, apparently never published but printed as a broadside, accused Evans of securing the chairmanship in order to falsify enough votes to deny the governorship to Cole Blease. John L. McLaurin scrapbook, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

[65] *State,* June 27-29, 1942.

[66] *News and Courier,* June 28, 1942.

[67] *State,* September 1, 1908.

BURNET MAYBANK AND CHARLESTON POLITICS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA

MARVIN CANN

In the New Deal era, Burnet Rhett Maybank, a young cotton broker and member of the aristocracy, launched a public career which revamped the traditional structure of Charleston politics, resolved the city's financial crisis, and shattered the century-old myth that no Charlestonian could win a major state office. As mayor of Charleston from 1931 to 1938, Maybank presided over an effective municipal administration, secured financial aid from a variety of federal agencies, and established a political base among his "friends and neighbors" in the Low Country who elected him to the governor's office in 1938 and promoted him to the United States Senate in 1941.[1]

Burnet Maybank's candidacy for mayor in 1931 evolved from an effort by a citizens' committee, composed of prominent businessmen, to end the bitter partisan conflict which had marred Charleston's political life since the beginning of the century. In the absence of Republican opposition, Charleston's Democrats had split into two hostile camps and had fought a series of ruthless campaigns for control of the ctiy administration, and initially, the vital question in the 1931 election was whether, at a time of economic depression and financial crisis, this vicious factionalism would continue.

The dominant faction, led by Mayor Thomas Porcher Stoney since 1923, represented the Charleston aristocracy whose members shared a conservative political philosophy. They favored efficient, economical government and opposed radical changes or policies which might disturb the hallowed traditions of the city.[2]

The more democratic factions, composed primarily of small businessmen and workers, found a leader in John Patrick Grace, an Irish Catholic, a liberal Democrat, an advocate of social and economic reform, a critic of aristocratic privilege, who was regarded as a "wild Irishman" and a "dangerous radical" in the better circles of Charleston society.[3] Closely allied with Grace were William Turner Logan, John Ignatius Cosgrove, Archie P. Owens, and James Albert Von Dohlen. Although Grace had been defeated for mayor in 1923 by Stoney, a revitalized Grace organiza-

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[1] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation,* New York, 1949, pp. 135, 136.

[2] John Joseph Duffy, "Charleston Politics in the Progressive Era," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1963, p. 10.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 3; also author's interview with Cotesworth Pinckney Means, August 3, 1966.

tion swept the local contests in 1930, electing J. C. Long to the state senate and Alonzo Russell McGowan as circuit solicitor. The Grace faction seemed certain to offer a strong candidate for mayor in 1931.[4]

In January, 1931, fifty businessmen, representing both political blocs, formed a citizens' committee to support an independent candidate for mayor, thus avoiding a bitter partisan contest in the coming municipal election. At a public meeting on February 11, Andrew Jackson Geer warned that Charleston stood on the brink of bankruptcy and would have to choose between her "pocketbook or politics." In seeking to garner votes or to repay campaign debts, the politicians of both factions had mismanaged the city's affairs; the result was an operating budget deficit of $383,000 and an accumulated deficit in the sinking fund for municipal bonds of more than $2,000,000. If Charleston passed through another of her "damnable political campaigns," Geer said, the situation could only get worse. The only hope for improvement lay in the election of a non-partisan administration to direct the city's affairs.[5]

While John Grace expressed serious reservations about the proposal for a non-partisan administration, he and his allies agreed to support Burnet Maybank, a one-term alderman, who was nominated by the citizens' committee. On April 14, after a private conference with Maybank, Grace publicly endorsed Maybank and the plan for a coalition slate of city councilmen.[6] The era of peace and harmony ushered in by Grace's commitment lasted exactly twenty-one days, or until the city convention on May 6; the events of those three weeks can only tentatively be reconstructed.

On April 29, the Democratic clubs met and elected officers and convention delegates according to an agreement reached among Maybank, Grace, and Stoney. These club elections resulted in a party convention in which the Grace faction held a slight majority and a city executive committee composed of thirteen Grace partisans and twelve allies of Stoney. All convention delegates and committeemen, however, were pledged to Maybank and a coalition slate of aldermen.[7]

In the meantime, the alliance which had been formed to elect an independent ticket began to reveal severe structural flaws which eventually caused its collapse. The infection of suspicion and hostility had not vanished, and each faction questioned, at least privately, the good faith of its traditional enemy.

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[4] Charleston *Evening Post,* April 15, 1931.

[5] Charleston *News and Courier,* February 12, 1931.

[6] John Patrick Grace to Andrew Jackson Geer, February 22, 1931, Grace Papers, Duke University; see also Charleston *News and Courier,* April 15, 1931.

[7] Charleston *News and Courier,* April 30, 1931.

In a letter dated April 30, Cotesworth Pinckney Means, a close friend of Mayor Stoney, directed a highly emotional protest to A. J. Geer. "Whatever the nature of Burnet's understanding with Grace," he wrote, "it surely could not have contemplated the surrender of the voting balance [in council] and [his] integrity as an independent. . . ." Yet, Grace was bending every effort behind the scenes to control a majority of the council and Maybank was likely to be the victim of a "diabolically villainous plot to bind him hand and foot and drag him through the new council behind the Grace-Logan-Cosgrove chariot for four long, bitter, mocking years."[8]

Given Maybank's lack of experience in the snake pit of Charleston politics, apparently both Stoney and Grace expected to be the power behind the throne in the new administration; certainly both men employed their considerable talents to wreck the coalition almost from its inception. Stoney spread the rumor that Maybank was his man and would change neither the policies nor the personnel of the previous administration. Grace, who was willing to believe the worst about any member of the aristocracy, disrupted the alliance by manuevering to win control of the new council.

At the city convention on May 6, Grace and his partisans sabotaged the fragile coalition by attacking the Stoney administration and questioning Maybank's integrity. When the convention recessed, the non-partisan alliance was in ruins and Grace's intentions in doubt.[9]

On May 22, Grace called his endorsement of Maybank "the worst political mistake he had ever made" and urged his friends to consider some more acceptable candidate. After several weeks, Grace was able to persuade Lawrence Monck Pinckney to head a ticket of Grace partisans.[10] Meanwhile, Maybank had arranged his own aldermanic slate which included some of Stoney's associates and some allies of Grace who were still committed to the principle of coalition politics. Thus the battle lines were drawn and the Democratic primary campaign began.[11]

After a bitter contest which was marked by exaggerated charges and personal abuse on both sides, Maybank won a smashing victory by Charleston standards. He received 9,749 votes to 5,094 for Pinckney and carried his entire council ticket into office.[12] The crucial factor in Maybank's victory was his success in retaining his image as an independent who was not the tool of either traditional faction.

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[8] Cotesworth Pinckney Means to Geer, April 30, 1931. Letter in Means' possession.
[9] Charleston *News and Courier*, May 7, 1931.
[10] *Ibid.*, May 23, July 13, 1931.
[11] *Ibid.*, May 19-24, 1931.
[12] *Ibid.*, October 7, 1931.

In his inaugural address on December 14, 1931, Maybank painted a bleak picture of Charleston's position: the city had no money to meet current expenses, it faced a deficit of $468,500 for 1931, and it had interest payments of $136,500 due on January 1, 1932. During the coming year, the administration was obligated to pay $1,109,000 on bonds and notes which would mature, but previous administrations had accummulated no sinking fund to retire this debt. Years of inept management had placed Charleston in a precarious financial position and the impact of the national depression had produced mounting unemployment and declining tax revenues.[13]

Within two years, Maybank restored the city's credit, established its operating budget on a cash basis, and mustered community resources in an effort to cope with the problem of unemployment. Considering Charleston's condition at the outset of his administration, his success seems magical, but Maybank's wizardry consisted only of issuing scrip to meet immediate expenses, of leading an intensive drive to collect all revenue due the city, of paring operating costs to the bone, and of refinancing the ancient municipal debt.

To meet the municipal payroll and other current expenses during 1932, Maybank reluctantly decided to issue city scrip. Previous administrations had normally borrowed from local banks on short-term tax anticipation notes to pay operating costs until property taxes became due, but Maybank found that this source of credit was no longer available. During 1932 Charleston issued $374,000 in scrip and retired the fiat money at five percent interest in November. A smaller amount of scrip was issued and retired with equal success in 1933, and by 1934, the Maybank administration placed the operating budget on a cash basis.[14]

In the decade 1920-1930, the city budget exceeded $1,000,000 annually, reaching a record level of $1,210,645 in 1929. Under Maybank's direction, the council slashed municipal salaries and departmental appropriations in order to reduce the city budget by one-fourth. The first budget for Maybank's administration was $884,311, a reduction of $297,657 from 1931.[15] Although Maybank restored most salary reductions and raised the operating budget as Charleston's financial condition improved, throughout his term as mayor he demonstrated a conservative approach to municipal finance.

The accumulated municipal debt, partially dating from the antebellum era, posed the greatest challenge Maybank faced. This indebtedness, in the

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[13] Council *Journal* (1931-1935), pp. 4-5.

[14] Charleston *News and Courier,* January 13, November 22, 1932; see also Council *Journal* (1931-1935), p. 25.

[15] Charleston *Yearbook* (1929), p. 15; (1931), p. 37; (1932-1935), p. 63; also see Charleston *News and Courier,* November 11, 1933.

form of notes given for property and services, tax anticipation notes, and long-term municipal bonds, totalled more than $11,000,000 and could hardly be paid from current income. The only practical solution was to retire the short-term debt as quickly as possible and to refinance the balance on more favorable terms.[16] During 1932 Maybank reduced the accumulated debt by $650,906 and initiated a refunding program for the bonded debt when he refinanced $909,000 in paving bonds which had been issued by the Stoney administration. In 1936 Maybank completed the essential refunding program by issuing $3,350,000 in new bonds which were scheduled for repayment serially by 1965.[17]

In his inaugural address, Maybank expressed his hope that "the people . . . [will] realize that I have been elected Mayor and not President of an Employment Agency," but the critical problem of unemployment in Charleston forced him to devise a local work relief program.[18] The Bureau of the Census had reported in 1930 that 1,232 persons, or 4.5 percent of Charleston's labor force was unemployed; by January, 1932, the number of unemployed had soared to 6,500, or twenty percent of the work force.[19] On January 26, 1932, the city council created a citizens' committee to raise funds and administer a local work relief program. Although Maybank called upon his constituents to contribute $100,000 for the relief fund, the local campaign netted only $30,000 for the temporary relief program. More than 5,000 people applied for jobs and from March to December, 1932, the mayor's committee provided limited work for 3,845 men and women.[20] The local relief effort was entirely inadequate and convinced Maybank that only massive federal assistance could alleviate the problems created by the depression.

After the Democratic victory in the presidential election of 1932, Burnet Maybank quickly emerged as an outspoken champion of the New Deal. While many Southern Democrats "developed, in time, an embarrassing ambivalence toward Roosevelt and the New Deal," Maybank demonstrated a consistent loyalty to the president and his program.[21] Maybank's loyalty was both a matter of personal conviction and political ambition. He sincerely believed that federal aid was essential to combat the ravages of the depression and he saw an opportunity to secure municipal improve-

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[16] Council *Journal* (1931-1935), p. 140.

[17] Charleston *Yearbook* (1932-1935), p. 12; (1936), pp. 22-23.

[18] Council *Journal* (1932-1935), p. 9.

[19] United States, Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930. Unemployment Bulletin: South Carolina Unemployment Returns by Classes*, Washington, 1931, p. 7; see also Council *Journal* (1932-1935), p. 35.

[20] Council *Journal* (1932-1935), pp. 36, 169; see also Charleston *News and Courier*, May 29 and September 30, 1932.

[21] Frank Freidel, *FDR and the South*, Baton Rouge, La., 1965, p. 35.

ments already long overdue; at the same time, he grasped the political advantages inherent in the control of local relief projects and his much publicized friendship with an immensely popular president.

Through his political alliance with Senator James Francis Byrnes and his personal friendship with Harry Hopkins, Maybank sought "a fair proportion . . . of federal funds" for Charleston. His success may be judged partially by his report to the council in 1936 that federal appropriations for Charleston totalled $34,781,000; while a substantial part took the form of construction contracts at the navy yard, more than $20,000,000 had been allotted for work relief and public works.[22]

During Maybank's administration, Charleston benefited from a number of New Deal programs. The Civil Works Administration gave temporary employment to 4,800 men during 1933-34. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration and later, the Works Progress Administration, provided work relief and allowed the Maybank administration to acquire a new incinerator, the Dock Street Theater, a yacht basin, a prison farm, a new Negro orphanage, a gymnasium for the College of Charleston, two swimming pools, and three public housing projects.[23] With federal aid, Maybank secured essential municipal improvements which had been beyond the reach, if not the dream, of his predecessors.

By his own admission, Maybank entered public office with little knowledge of local politics, but he learned quickly and soon fashioned a personal organization which was largely responsible for his later success. To gain absolute control of the Charleston machine, Maybank alienated Thomas Stoney, reorganized the police administration, planted his allies in the federal relief agencies, and blocked J. C. Long's re-election to the state senate in 1934.

Although Maybank had campaigned as an independent in 1931, he incurred a large political debt to Tom Stoney who had worked enthusiastically for a Maybank victory. Stoney entertained the hope that he would wield power behind the scenes in the new administration, but quickly found that this ambition would not materialize. Maybank was shrewd enough to realize that continued association with Stoney would be a serious liability, and after his inauguration, he avoided and ignored the former mayor. In 1934, when Stoney had been led to believe that his appointment as federal District Attorney was certain, Maybank, his father-in-law, Frank K. Myers, and Senator Byrnes intervened with Roosevelt to block Stoney's nomination. Stoney was embittered by disappointment and saw his defeat as the result

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[22] Council *Journal* (1935-1939), pp. 2, 134.

[23] Charleston *News and Courier*, February 16, 1934; January 8, 1935; November 26, 1937; see also Charleston *Yearbook* (1937), p. 179.

of a conspiracy among Roosevelt, Byrnes, and Maybank – and he roundly damned them all. He was completely alienated from the New Deal and became Byrnes' opponent in the senate contest in 1936.[24]

Politically, the police department was the most sensitive municipal agency, and in order to insure his control of police activities, Maybank appointed a new police commission composed of his most loyal allies – S. Marshall Sanders, Edward R. McDonald, Cotesworth P. Means, and later, Henry W. Lockwood.[25] Since Lockwood, the commission chairman, was the political boss of the Charleston organization and chairman of the city Democratic Party, it was hardly possible for the police department to be apolitical; in fact, the department remained a major cog in the Charleston machine and in Maybank's later campaigns, some of his most dedicated workers were the Charleston policemen.

The administration of the federal relief programs enabled Maybank to strengthen his organization in the city and extend it into the county precincts which were strongholds of J. C. Long. Maybank had representation on all state advisory boards which approved federal projects for the counties. His personal friend and political ally, Edmund Grice, served as chairman of the Charleston County Relief Council which directed the CWA and FERA projects, and after 1935, was WPA director for a five-county region which included Charleston. With members of his political clan directing the federal relief programs, Maybank received credit for the jobs which New Deal agencies provided, and while there is no evidence that he played politics with relief jobs, certainly his association with the New Deal strengthened his hand in Charleston.[26]

In 1934 Maybank marshalled his forces to defeat J. C. Long in his bid for re-election to the state senate and Russell McGowan who had announced for a second term as circuit solicitor. Maybank had not forgiven their betrayal of 1931; they were his only political enemies who held local office and might provide the nucleus of future opposition.

When the Democratic precincts were organized on April 28, 1934, the Maybank forces gained control of the twenty-four city clubs and fourteen of the sixteen county clubs.[27] The *News and Courier* attributed Maybank's victory to "personality, popularity, organization and work" and especially to his "old-fashioned, time-honored, debt-paying, money-saving, tax-reducing ways in the running of his town's affairs."[28]

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[24] Author's interview with Robert McCormick Figg, Dean, University of South Carolina Law School, August 17, 1966.

[25] Council *Journal* (1931-1935), p. 94.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 613.

[27] Charleston *News and Courier*, April 29, 1934.

[28] *Ibid.*, May 1, 1934.

Whatever its cause, Maybank's control of the local Democratic organization resulted in an unusually tame county convention. For the first time in the twentieth century, no policemen were in Hibernian Hall to keep order and hardly a dissenting vote was cast. The convention endorsed all officers nominated by the Maybank leadership and approved the resolutions offered by the administration. To oppose J. C. Long in the senate race, the Maybank machine nominated Cotesworth P. Means, an insurance broker and member of the city council; Robert McCormick Figg, a young lawyer, received the nomination for circuit solicitor.[29]

In some respects, the ensuing campaign marked the first confrontation between two ambitious young New Dealers – Burnet Maybank and Olin D. Johnston, who was an upcountry candidate for governor. In the Charleston contest, Johnston clearly favored his college roommate, J. C. Long, and Maybank resented Johnston's interest in local affairs. During the campaign, Means charged that Long expected to become a "petty political dictator" and warned that he would be successful if returned to the senate with "old bone-dry Johnston as governor." The Democratic primary was a sweeping victory for the Maybank organization. Means defeated Long by a vote of 9,999 to 8,719; and Figg outpolled McGowan, 11,140 to 7,788.[30] The election left Maybank in undisputed control of all city and county offices and his opposition shattered and demoralized.

Following his defeat in the senate contest, Long seriously considered entering the race for mayor in 1935. He received encouragement from Grace, McGowan, and Stoney, and held one meeting on February 20, 1935, to test public support for his candidacy.

Questioned by reporters the following day, Maybank refused to comment upon Long's prospective candidacy, but in a letter to Harry Hopkins, he wrote that "the meeting was based on the idea of getting control of the relief money to kick me out . . . and eventually . . . to get Jimmy [Byrnes] . . ." Maybank described Grace as "Roosevelt's bitterest enemy in this section" and cautioned that if the relief program should fall into Grace's hands, "it *will* be used for political purposes. . . ."[31] (my italics)

The Maybank organization dominated the 1935 city convention which renominated the mayor unanimously and elected his friends to all party offices. In the face of this awesome display of political strength, Long decided that opposition was futile and refused to enter the race. On July 9, 1935, Maybank was elected to a second term without opposition. He

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[29] *Ibid.*, May 8, 1934.

[30] *Ibid.*, August 31, 1934.

[31] Burnet Rhett Maybank to Harry Hopkins, February 21, 1935, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

had unified the city politically for the first time since 1907 and had eliminated factionalism from Charleston politics.[32] The victories of 1934 and 1935 gave Maybank an impregnable base from which to launch a bid for higher office, and in 1938, Maybank announced his candidacy for governor.

In a gubernatorial campaign which was devoid of substantive issues, Maybank led an eight-man field and faced Wyndham Meredith Manning in a run-off primary. The contest in the second primary was nip-and-tuck across the state and was decided by the vote in Charleston County. As William Watts Ball commented: "Maybank had a close shave; at 8 o'clock last night, I thought he was beaten. . . ."[33] Without the Charleston vote, Manning led Maybank by 147,994 votes to 142,083, but the powerful Charleston machine assured Maybank of victory. The mayor swept his home county by a margin of nearly twenty to one, polling 21,864 votes to 1,374 for Manning.[34]

Manning charged that Maybank had won the election by fraud, but the state Democratic Executive Committee rejected the protest and confirmed Maybank's nomination. That acute observer of Charleston's political mores, W. W. Ball, thought Manning had little cause for complaint. "I am confident that the election here was fair," he wrote, "and I am equally confident that the count was fair. Maybank's managers well knew that it simply would not do [to] attempt any skulduggery. . . ."[35]

Maybank received a huge vote in Charleston not only because he controlled the city's political machine, but also because he had been an effective and popular mayor. Charleston voters saw an opportunity to put a native son into the State House for the first time in nearly a century. As one of Manning's friends had warned early in the campaign, those "Charleston dutchmen are going to turn over heaven and hell to put him in the governor's chair. . . ."[36]

Away from Charleston, where he had to run well in order to win, Maybank enjoyed the advantages of his association with the New Deal, the support of those talented politicians allied with Senator Byrnes, and his obvious sincerity on the stump. Moreover, men who respected both Manning and Maybank, who counted both as friends, supported Maybank

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[32] Charleston *News and Courier*, July 10, 1935.

[33] William Watts Ball to Sara [Mrs. Mason Langston Copeland], September 14, 1938, Ball Papers, Duke University.

[34] Alexander Heard and Donald S. Strong, *Southern Primaries and Elections*, University, Ala., 1950, p. 108.

[35] Ball to Sara, September 14, 1938, Ball Papers.

[36] Taylor Keels to Wyndham Meredith Manning, June 13, 1938, Manning Papers, South Caroliniana Library.

because they felt that Manning suffered by comparison. As James C. Derieux commented:

> Maybank might do some big things for South Carolina, because he has energy, drive and imagination; Manning would be entirely agreeable, safe and dependable, but not too active. Maybank has already done things; Manning has not, though Manning is the older man. Maybank is a national figure; Manning is not, and probably never would become one. Maybank . . . seems to have more zest and drive.[37]

The precise motives of voters are beyond the ken of the historian, but South Carolinians chose Maybank over Manning, and on January 17, 1939, he became Governor of South Carolina. Maybank's victory laid to rest the ancient myth that no Charlestonian could win that office.

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[37] James C. Derieux to Ball, August 2, 1938, Ball Papers. Apparently the date should be September 2, 1938, since the letter refers to the results of the first primary.

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